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SUMMARY
There is an increasing interest of companies and government agencies to snoop on peo-
ple’s daily lives the increasing difficulty for people to handle such scenarios. The need
for private communications is perhaps greater than ever before. Government officials have
stated that, “if you have enough meta-data you don’t really need content” and that, “we kill
people based on meta-data”. People have long needed to keep the communications among
themselves private, but, increasingly, they may want to conceal not only the messages that
they exchange, but also with whom they are communicating—or even the fact that they
are communicating at all. This latter type of communication is said to be not only confi-
dential and anonymous but also deniable, in the sense that despite exchanging messages,
participants can plausibly deny that any such exchanges ever took place.
This dissertation develops techniques and systems that empower users in physical prox-
imity to have mechanisms for deniable communications. Our work builds from the obser-
vation of noise in the surrounding technologies like wireless networks or powerline net-
works. We use noise instead of protocol obfuscation to create deniable channels between
individuals who do not want any third party to recognize that there is possible communica-
tion in progress. First, we develop Denali, which uses link layer of 802.11 protocol which
achieves this by leveraging the weakness of packet corruption in wireless networks due to
its ubiquitous nature of being broadcast medium. Second, we leverage innocuous-looking
powerline networks used for powering devices in building infrastructure. We build Pow-
erline Whisperer, where one uses physical layer for deniable communication. It depends
on the thermal noise and the electromagnetic interference due to devices present in the
medium for message cover. Both these systems allow the users to do point-to-point com-
munication and defend against powerful adversaries who might be interested in snooping




There are variety of anonymous electronic communications systems have emerged to pro-
vide important—and often widely used—communications channels, but most focus primar-
ily on wide-area communications (e.g., Tor [1], which supports communications between
Internet-connected end hosts that are often separated by great distances) where deniability
can sometimes be provided by hiding in a very large crowd of Internet citizens. In the
circumstances we consider, a wide-area anonymous communication system not only in-
troduces unnecessary complexity and latency, but exposes the parties to additional risk by
requiring them to send their messages over the wide-area Internet. Tor provides its users
with anonymity as one can find that you are using Tor, but they cannot find who you are
communicating with. Tor cannot be termed as a deniable communication channel, however
it provides deniability with pluggable transport.
Communication has tremendously transformed over the past 25 years. Link layer tech-
nologies such as wireless local-area networks (Wi-Fi) and cellular networks now domi-
nate the communication paradigm. Although the technologies at the application layer have
changed in the past couple of decades (even the world-wide-web), there are more accessi-
ble and open to understanding of people. There have been side-channels developed at the
application layer exploiting using protocol obfuscation and side channels using transport
layer protocols, much of the lower layers have not been effectively exploited in terms of
what they can provide to current people which is not just basic requirement of communica-
tion, but also much needed privacy.
People have long needed to keep the communications among themselves private, but,
increasingly, they may want to conceal not only the messages that they exchange, but also
with whom they are communicating—or even the fact that they are communicating at all.
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and anonymous, but also deniable, in the sense that despite exchanging messages, partici-
pants can plausibly deny that any such exchanges ever took place. Deniability in wide area
networks is offered by Tor to an extent. It can be effective against local adversaries on the
Internet but can be detected by global adversary attacks on BGP [2]. Assuming there is
widespread surveillance on the Internet, one cannot be sure of the anonymity.
We consider scenarios where people congregate in common public spaces and want
to communicate with others in that same space, yet wish to keep their communications
both confidential and deniable. Moreover, it may be the case that one or more parties to
the communication wish to remain anonymous. Consider, for example, a covert message
exchange between a spy and her handler in a coffee shop, a whistle blower in an office
environment, or a group of activists who wish to covertly organize a public protest. These
scenarios require local communication that is confidential, anonymous, and deniable.
It is meaningful to investigate alternate technologies to be used in such scenarios, some
of which might be more applicable in this context. In this dissertation I present systems on
two such technologies –802.11 wireless networks which are very popular currently today
and powerline networks which are slowly becoming popular for communication between
devices. Such technologies are not explored in the past and provide fresh perspective on
their usage.
There are different approaches for hiding messages, one being usage of protocol obfus-
cation, where the mechanism is to mimic the traffic pattern of popular Internet protocols and
evade network adversaries measuring traffic data patterns using the Internet measurement
infrastructure. On the other hand, we use noise, indicative of natural physical phenomenon
and hide covert messages in it. While “noise” might be used in body of research as some-
thing which is irrelevant to the actual information (the signal), but we use the term in a
literal sense. In specific case of two works – in DenaLi, it refers to corrupted 802.11 wire-
less packets and in case of PowerLine Whisperer, it refers to the electrical noise present





























Figure 1.1: Research contribution in broader context
background noise on the channel.
Figure 1.1 puts the dissertation in context with broader research. There are differ-
ent covert communication channels developed in the past, an extensive and most relevant
overview in the context of the dissertation is presented in chapter 2 on Background Work.
There are different application layer channels built on top of browser applications such as
Tor, which are used by the Internet users primarily for hiding their identity while browsing
different internet websites and have certain features called pluggable transports which can
be used to deniable communication properties.
For instance, Scramble-suit [3], SkypeMorph [4], meek, obfs4 are application layer
deniable communication system using protocol obfuscation operating over Tor bridges over
the Internet. Apart from SkypeMorph, there have been covert channels using TCP header
fields which as side channels for communication which are not strictly in the umbrella of
deniable communication.

















Figure 1.2: Covert channels at different layers of the networking stack for modern commu-
nication systems
covert communication systems can be used. Moving lower down the network stack of pro-
tocols used by modern communicating devices such as laptops and other static computing
devices such as desktops, we witness link-layer protocols. These protocol (such as Ethernet
or 802.11) headers are dropped at the first hop of the network and hence can be used only in
the case when the intended receiver is the first hop of the network. The Ethernet protocol is
implemented for the wired medium which use co-axial cables and well insulated Ethernet
wires which are built especially to provide very low packet error rates. On the other hand,
the world has continually moved towards wireless networks in the past couple of decades
which has given rise to different protocols in the family of IEEE 802.11. These protocols
have been evolving to improve with time to provide higher throughput and have battled
natural phenomenon of packet corruption in practical wireless channels.
Similarly, leveraging randomness in physical layer channel conditions in characteristics
of physical layer lends them helpful to users in physical proximity. These approaches are
useful with a view to avoid and bypass adversaries on the Internet which can correlate the
user identity with different traffic patterns even in the presence of anonymous communica-
tion system as Tor. A state-level adversary lacks a global telescope to identify the activity
of an individual with as much as ease as on the Internet and might have to install mas-
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sive infrastructure to detect such communication anywhere. It would need several vantage
points and much more data collection and analysis that it might not be practical to deploy
it.
1.1 Thesis statement
In this dissertation, we posit that there is a need for a different set of tools which take
advantages of using local networks such as Wifi and Power-lines to perform deniable mes-
sage exchange. We use the presence of the ubiquitous phenomenon of packet corruption or
channel noise as cover traffic and demonstrate how we can achieve this goal. We develop
prototype systems that exploits the presence of noise in different mediums for point-to-
point deniable communication.
1.2 Contributions
This dissertation makes the following contributions in defense of the thesis statement:
1. A deniable communication system, DenaLi on wireless channel using packet corrup-
tion in 802.11 networks at the link layer
2. A deniable communication system, PowerLine Whisperer on powerline channel us-
ing the ambient noise at the physical layer
Figure 1.2 shows the contribution of the thesis with respect to the networking stack used
in modern communication systems. We extend the dimension of deniable covert channels
in the direction of different network communication layers, which existed for application
layers we now have mechanisms for link layer and physical layer.
Covert channels might appear as a by-product of side-channel. In our exploration, we
noticed that noise generated from SMPS regulator of a laptop adapter might be a side
channel information which can be used as a covert channel for communicating information
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in near-fields. Such phenomenon has been noticed in electromagnetic spectrum in the air
as the medium, it has not been explicitly noticed in powerline medium. The primary cause
of this phenomenon in mediums such as air and powerline is the same but there is a subtle
difference.
The difference in the EMI noticed by using a magnetic loop are directly due to the
movement in the power-cycle of the different physical units being powered by smaller
power converters on the devices like desktop/laptop. On the other hand, such phenomenon
on powerline is a reflection of a second-order activity of the SMPS transformer which
changes as a result of combined activity of different physical units performing different
tasks simultaneously. This is usually centered at the switching frequency of the SMPS
transformer. Due to this limitation, it is not practical to get information about every task
executed by the physical units at a finer granularity.
We now elaborate on these contributions.
Recognizing the need for anonymous, deniable communications. There have been
communication tools which use the public infrastructure such as telephone and cellular
networks, while also the Internet. Such infrastructure takes longer routes passing through
multiple hops physically while also logged by different services used by users to make the
connection. Instead, in settings where parties are physically close to one another requires
for a new class of communications tools. These tools can bypass the use of such massive
infrastructure and also various mechanisms to log such communications. We specifically
focus on making such means possible. We define the notion of deniability and design
modulation schemes that achieve deniability by matching the properties of corrupted Wifi
packets to the cover erroneous packets or noise properties of the channel.
Ubiquitous presence of different technologies and phenomenon. There are ubiquitous
technologies such as WiFi and Power-lines present already in urban settings which can
serve as useful channels for different forms of communication which might provide re-
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lief to the growing obsession of capturing every form of information regarding subjects
by different corporations and governments. We have WiFi communication (and the corre-
sponding wireless frame corruption) can serve as useful cover to conceal communications.
Similarly, presence of noise in powerlines is also an opportunity to leverage it for commu-
nicating messages between individuals.
Prototype systems. There has been previous discussions and mention of such communi-
cation paradigm in Computer science literature but there have been no real-world imple-
mentation of such techniques. We implement prototype systems based on designs in our
works and evaluate their performance in different settings. We have some notion of ground
truth in such settings with our experiments which we try to match.
The following are some general comments based on the experiences and beliefs of the
author rather than claims backed by evidence.
1. Tradeoff between deniability and throughput. While building two systems and have
revisited an old lesson of the trade-off between throughput and deniability. Some-
times perfect security or privacy is not as important as the usability and portability
of the equipment. With different approaches to side-channel, it is difficult to say
what is the optimal detection strategy for a technique. There might not exist one in
certain cases or might not be worth the time to understand the details. What is prac-
tical might not require a detail scientific scrutiny due to the nature of its operation in
conditions in the wild. On the other hand, a rigorous scientific strategy for providing
deniability might not be a practical solution to be deployed in the wild.
2. Protocol Obfuscation vs Noise. Understanding the underlying distribution (corre-
sponding to null the hypothesis of no covert communication) has been the general
guiding principle for covert channels. This might look very different when stud-
ied in usage patterns of an application, or transport protocols on the Internet to the
link-layer and physical-layer work presented in the thesis. The view presented in the
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thesis is morphed by digital world and one might apply similar principles to com-
municate in analog world to achieve deniability. On a cursory thought, one might
think using protocol(which can be seen as a strict set of rules) obfuscation might be
a difficult task for the construction of covert channel than using the physical layer
but our experience has given us the impression that physical layer has it own set of
physical laws which make it a challenge to construct covert channel. In one sense,
digital world is much more forgiving than analog.
3. Analytical solutions in real-world setting. The difficulty with mathematical mod-
eling is the problem formulation assumes no understanding of engineering. Strict
Provability of deniability vs practicality of a system can be two requirements which
are hard to combine. When we tie ourselves to mathematical models, we have certain
assumptions. These mathematical models might not map to the real world and might
require certain details which are interesting but do not have an analytical solution.
Analytical solutions might be hard to compute or even formulate mathematically.
There can be limits that are imposed on models (with notations suggesting values of
the random variable, such as deniability tending to zero) which might not be prac-
tical. Such limits, in theory, might not transform to algorithms which work in real
communication channel with noise.
4. Theory and Practice. Engineers often across the problem of clocks for communica-
tion systems [5] for synchronization. Such drifts cause the issues of packet corrup-
tion. Synchronization algorithms interpolate on the energy on the channel to avoid
clock drift and hence the bits are usually scrambled before transmission on the chan-
nel. Such requirement might not be fulfilled in the case of sparse transmissions of
bits. It might be a challenge to design stealth codes to be used on the channel while
keeping the signal close to the noise floor.
As we discuss deniability in different settings in chapter 2, we can say that there is no
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correct answer for a perfectly deniable system which works in all the practical settings.
1.3 Outline
We present background on anonymous, deniable and privacy-preserving technologies in
Chapter 2. Chapter 3 presents a unified adversary model for the following chapters which is
modified later according to practical adversarial capabilities in different settings. Chapter 4
presents a new technique of using packet corruption in 802.11 for deniable communication.
Chapter 5 presents a system PowerLine Whisperer using powerline channel for deniable
communication. We do not exploit an existing protocol standard as in the previous chapter
but evaluate a more general technique for covert communication in presence of power-line
noise. We conclude with a discussion of general lessons learned while designing these two
systems in Chapter 6.
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
2.1 Wide-Area Communication
Many existing anonymous communications [6, 7, 8] systems aim to provide various levels
of anonymity in the wide area. One of the most widely used anonymous communications
systems is Tor [1], which allows communicating parties to establish anonymous communi-
cations channels via a layered encryption technique called onion routing [9]. Users of Tor
establish circuits to communicate with each other anonymously in the wide-area. Tor pro-
vides anonymity but not deniability, in the sense that users of Tor can conceal who they are
talking to, but not the fact that they are communicating using Tor (in fact, Tor is blocked in
many countries outright). Tor is not strictly deniable, however, it provides deniability with
the use of pluggable transport [10, 3, 11]. There are other systems [12] which consider a
different adversary model where the adversary has access to servers (all but one) which can
provide deniability between two parties connected to it. Such systems are similar to Tor but
explicitly provide a point-to-point communication channel. The fact that one connects to
such service might cause suspicion to an adversary and might be a limitation with respect
to certain point-of-view. Such systems consider the uncorrupted frame (which have correct
forward error checksums) which do not belong to the actual sender as noise. The analy-
sis framework used is Differential Privacy. While in our works, the noise refers to frames
which are actually malformed having an erroneous forward error checksum or raw channel
noise.
Deniability offered by Tor can be effective against local adversaries on the Internet but
can be detected by global adversary attacks on BGP [2]. The focus of this dissertation is
different than Tor’s: it aims to enable anonymous and deniable communication in settings
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where the communicating parties are physically close to one another.
DenaLi bears similarity to other censorship circumvention systems that aim to achieve
deniability and covertness in addition to confidentiality and anonymity. Two such systems
that operate from end systems are Infranet [13] and Collage [14]. These systems allow par-
ticipants to establish communications under the cover of innocuous Web traffic: the censor
only sees Web requests that are statistically indistinguishable from normal user behavior,
thus providing the user with an important degree of deniability, in addition to confidential-
ity. Other recent systems such as Telex [8], Cirripede [15], and Decoy Routing [16] aim to
achieve similar levels of deniability by deploying infrastructure in the core of the network
rather than at end systems.
Briar [17] provides a secure, point-to-point anonymous encrypted communications chan-
nel between users’ devices; like DenaLi, Briar enables point-to-point communication, but
Briar does not provide deniability.
In all the wide-area network settings, there is a notion of packet which carries infor-
mation of the user. This frame(packet) has an integrity to it and one can trust the contents
of the packets. This is very different when one starts to doubt the integrity of the contents
of the packet as in the case of DenaLi or not even have a notion of packet but actual raw
noise at the physical layer in case of PowerLine Whisperer. Packets are trusted source of
information and the adversaries use techniques such as deep packet inspection to identify
different headers and contents on the packet, which changes in our adversary model where
the packets are corrupted and the information they carry cannot be trusted or there are
electrical impulses on the channel, the nature of which does not seem to appear to be of
carrying information.
2.2 Information Theoretic Security and Steganography
Previous work establishes theoretical limits of deniable communication on additive white
Gaussian noise (AWGN) channel [18, 19] and binary symmetric channel(BSC) [20]. The
11




n log n) depending on the knowledge of
adversary’s channel characteristics. An optical covert channel is analyzed [21], limited
to quantum treatment. In contrast, we work with powerlines, using RF spectrum which
brings another set of challenges in building the system. We work with relatively cheap and
inexpensive instrument to build affordable and practical transmitter and receiver, instead of
highly synchronized channels challenging quantum limits. The quasi-classical channel can
be approximated with AWGN channel, similar to our case. We are building a system which
considers ambient thermal(due to random motion of conducting particles) and appliance
noise, which can be approximated as an AWGN channel.
Steganography [22, 23, 24, 25] is a technique used at the application layer. This differs
from current work which uses physical layer of communication. Steganography embeds the
secret message in already existing data (such as images, documents termed as covertext)
and assumes that stegotext produced is not corrupted by channel noise, which is sufficiently
different from current work. The uncorrupted message is also required to be exported from
Alice to Bob, which is a significant challenge to overcome, given Willie is observing the
channel. Alice can have positive rate Steganography by embedding n bits in O(n) bit
covert text using a secret key of size O(n), and Alice can safely embed O(
√
n log n)) bits
by modifying O(
√
n) symbols out of n symbols in the covertext, using a secret key size of
O(
√
n log n) bits. The log(n) factor is because the channel to Bob is noiseless. The results
in Steganography and covert communication look similar as both use the framework of
statistical hypothesis testing and the fact that both depend on the property that relative
entropy is locally quadratic [26].
2.3 Near-Field Communication
In cellular communication, spread spectrum approach spreads the narrow-bandwidth mes-
sage over a wider bandwidth. Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS) [27] reduces the
power spectral density of the transmitted message. This is done by using a spreading code
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whose most important non-security application is multiple access, used in Code Division
Multiple Access (CDMA). The user data is signal is combined by a code (usually binary)
sequence and the duration every element in the code is called ”chip time”. The ratio of the
symbol time and the chip time is called the spreading factor. The transmitted signal will
occupy a bandwidth that is spreading times the bandwidth of the user data. In the receiver,
the receiver signal will again be multiplied by the same sequence which will recover the
original user data. Examples of such codes might be Pseudo Noise code, Walsh Hadamard,
Gold and Kasami codes. This spreading of the energy over a larger bandwidth might be
thought of as providing stealth to the scheme but it is not a property by design, instead, it
is an outcome of providing the ability of multi-user access where different users can have
different spreading sequences which can be used to decode the message. Frequency Hop-
ping Spread Spectrum (FHSS) [28] also spreads the code by hopping frequencies using
a frequency hopping sequence. It could be hard to be detected by an adversary, yet it is
not covert in general as the spreading may not be on the order of
√
n pulses in n channel
use. In comparison, the scheme proposed in this work spreads information in time domain.
Although DSSS (used in CDMA) allows the information to hide under the noise floor, it
is a very well studied technique with numerous algorithms to blindly detect [29, 30, 31]
and estimate signal parameters like center frequency, bandwidth and chipping codes. We
do not use spread spectrum techniques as they are not built on principles to provide covert-
ness, rather a by-product of the technique. In contrast, the scheme used has well-defined
framework and focus on providing covertness.
Authors [32] use 802.11 WiFi protocol for a physical layer covert communication chan-
nel. We differentiate our work that it does not require background legitimate communi-
cation traffic to hide and leverages noise omnipresent in nature. It also provides more
comprehensive framework with finer measurements granting flexibility and strength to the
adversarial analysis. Covert channels using light sources like video displays [33, 34, 35,
36] or LEDs [37] or RF [38, 39, 40, 41] require direct line-of-sight for exchanging infor-
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mation. On the other hand, wireless medium gives more degree of freedom to the adversary
in terms of distance and location for detecting the communication.
2.4 Anonymous Communications
Previous work has sketched systems that use corrupted wireless frames to create a covert
channel over 802.11 frames [42, 43] but no previous work has moved beyond paper de-
signs. Calhoun et al. designed and simulated a covert channel based upon varying the link
rate [44]. This work is purely simulation-based and develops neither a working prototype
nor a communication protocol for exchanging messages. None of the previous work ana-
lyzes deniability in the presence of an adversary that can monitor channel quality. There
has not been any work in powerline communication which would be considered close to
providing anonymous, deniable or any other forms of advantage to the party using it for
communication. The purview of communication on powerlines is discussed in the follow-
ing subsection.
2.5 Powerline Communication
There is no covert channel on powerlines to the best of our knowledge. There is a large
body of work on using powerline for communication for a different frequency ranges [45].
Instead of building powerline coupler [46] for communication channel that can be config-
ured for different frequency. Contrary to the standard communication requirement, we are
interested in electromagnetic spectrum which has seemingly more noise to hide the covert
communication. There are commercial products which are capable of communication us-
ing Ethernet-over-power technology and others that troubleshoot wireless and Internet-of-
things [47]. We have not found open-source device drivers or firmware that can be modified
for covert communication. We believe open-sourcing such hardware will allow another set
of operational frequencies to be used for deniable communication against the traffic gener-
ated by these devices. We will leave it as a future work to be explored in subsequent years
14




The aim of an adversary is to detect covert communication with high confidence. In this
chapter, we give an overview of a generalized adversary model used in the dissertation.
We deal with the specific adversary in chapter 4 for DenaLi and chapter 5 for PowerLine
Whisperer.
In the model shown in Figure 3.1, Alice and Bob are interested in deniable communi-
cation; Willie passively listens on the channel. Let X represent the random variable which
represents symbols transmitted by Alice. The random variable Y, represents the noisy
version of X received by Bob, while Z represent the observations at the eavesdropper. Fur-
thermore, the conditional probability of observation of sequence Y, given the sequence X
was transmitted is WY |X and that of the observation Z at Willie, given sequence X is given
by WZ|X . Alice transmits a message W, which is estimated by the intended receiver, Bob
as Ŵ with errors due to channel presence of channel noise. The noise power at eavesdrop-
per Willie and Bob are denoted by Nw and Nb, respectively. The secret key S is the shared
secret between Alice and Bob, unknown to Willie.
Let the adversary use a binary hypothesis detector with the following two hypothesis:
• H0: Covert communication is not present.
• H1: Covert communication is present.
Let P n0 denote the n-fold probability distribution of observations measured at Bob. Let
Qn0 denote the n-fold probability distribution of observations measured at Willie, when
there is no communication between Alice and Bob over n channel instances. Let Q̂n de-
note the n-dimensional probability distribution observed by Willie during actual symbol
















Figure 3.1: Security Model
imizes the sum of error probabilities α + β. This test yields the tradeoff of probability
of error [48] as α + β ≥ 1 − V (Qn0 , Q̂n), where n is the number of uses of the channel.
V (Qn0 , Q̂
n) represents the variational distance (i.e., a measure of difference) between the
true distribution Qn0 because of noise, and the estimated distribution Q̂n in the presence of
communication.
This is a formal framework to model adversary in communication over a channel. We
use this framework in different details in the two works in the thesis. In a general sense,
to some extent, this approach is used in cryptography where the text is compared in the
presence and absence of a good encryption scheme. We use this purely in the context of
the message received by adversary over a noisy channel.
The statistical distributions P n0 and Q
n
0 can represent the application layer or natural
phenomenon at physical layer depending on the covert channel. The principle remains
the same while the treatment may vary significantly. The heart of the argument lies in
the difference of the perturbed distribution due to the presence of covert communication
and the original distribution. This is captured by the variational distance between the two
distribution which can be measured as L1 distance as in the case of DenaLi or KL distance
as measured in PowerLine Whisperer. The limitations of such a theoretical measure are
commented on chapter 5 followed by experimental analysis.
Adversary have different capabilities in the two cases of DenaLi and PowerLine Whis-
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perer. DenaLi has an adversary which works at the Medium Access Control(MAC) layer,
where it is restricted to measurements and distribution over the bits decoded by the wire-
less ASIC. In PowerLine Whisperer, the adversary is much more capable. This comes at the
cost of form factor as we prototype the system using software-defined radio. The adversary
works at the physical layer and measures electrical voltages from the power-line channel.
The secret key S can be thought of an abstraction for the two pieces, which not only
includes the previous definition of the location of time slots in the case of PowerLine Whis-
perer but also the time, place of meeting as well as the frequency of operation of trans-
mission of message. It is the information that the adversary does not know. In the case
of DenaLi, it would represent the time and place as well as the cryptographic keys which
would be used for deriving the session key. These would need to be an out-of-band ex-
change between Alice and Bob.
Unlike a pre-conceived notion of noise being completely unpredictable quantity, noise
has statistical properties, depending on the channel. Although the statistical properties can
be well defined the interaction of channel with different entities in it might cause sudden
and unpredictable events which might not be well captured by the mathematical model.
Wireless channel has been researched in depth due to the development of reliable wire-
less technologies in the past decade and still faces challenges at the physical layer. These
problems at the lower layer and the developed inconsistencies are tackled at higher layers
of the networking stack. The layered approach provides excellent separation for handling
reliability challenges in communication. DenaLi build on the MAC layer and hence does
not assume a channel model. The physical layer is abstracted by the logic burnt into the
ASIC below in the device driver. PowerLine Whisperer analysis is built on AWGN channel.
This is done due to the simplicity offered by the channel model. Any real channel can be
fragmented over a smaller bandwidth which individually resembles AWGN characteristics.
We have not undertaken complex models as the analysis becomes analytically cumbersome
and does not provide any explicit advantage.
18
Another dimension to identify the capability of the adversary is physical proximity or
the location with respect to the transmitter and the number of instances conducting mea-
surements. Each of the chapters 4, 5 completely define the adversary and present arguments
for complex scenarios.
Apart from modeling, one needs to compute the likelihood ratio and evaluate its perfor-
mance. From an engineering point of view, even though the model is good, one might not
know the parameters in it, e.g.. covariance function might not be enough to justify numeri-
cal evaluation of the formulas from the model. One might think of white noise assumption
as a part of engineering contribution. It is important to understand that white noise is an
idealized realization of noise whose bandwidth is much large than the signal. One might
be inclined to study cases of colored noise, that is the noise whose power spectral density
varies with frequency. Such a solution is difficult to obtain mathematically and modeling
the exact physical phenomenon might also be non-trivial. An example would be a noise
who is well behaved such that it is twice differentiable. Modeling noise as white noise
is a way of leaving less important details so that one does not have to involve himself in
performing tedious operations on data.
The signals to be detected in can be of different types. The first type of signals might be
deterministic signals, which have certain parameters that are used to generate them. This
would be the case of PowerLine Whisperer where the amplitude, phase or the initial phase
can be configured by the transmitter. The second type might be stochastic signals, such
as in the case of noise generated by electrical appliances as discussed in exploring SMPS
noise. Adversary can also be able to model and understand the channel where the parties
are interested in performing deniable communication.
3.1 Channel characteristics
In the wide-area network, modeling the channel will depend on the threat model. It will
involve the traffic pattern of the interested parties. In the case of deniable communication
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using the underlying traffic of Skype, would require to model it as a discrete channel.
Depending on the kind of adversary who looks at packet timings or the distribution of bits
in the Skype packets using deep packet inspection.
Such deep packet inspection engines are expensive and used by authoritative govern-
ments to block access to certain content on the Internet. Although they have not been
specifically used for blocking deniable communication but are extensively used to block
the underlying services like Tor.
In case of DenaLi, the adversary has access to only the link-layer information or in
other words modeled as a binary channel. PowerLine Whisperer uses the physical layer,
which is approximate as an AWGN channel (more digital values than just 0 and 1) and we
model information exchange as trigonometric signals in the most fundamental sense.
The general formulations in statistical literature of sequential hypothesis testing and
statistical detection theory are used for signal detection problems. As mentioned above, a
generic problem is to choose between two hypothesis as with signal having a form as
s(t) = αA(t)cos(ω(t) + θ)
The signal can be of broadly three different forms with different information available
to the adversary -
1. Completely known signal
2. Knowing the general form but not the exact parameters of amplitude or phase
3. Stochastic process
PowerLine Whisperer has an adversary which falls in category 1 while there might
be adversaries which might want to learn about the noise from devices which might be
broadly categorized into category 3 as the noise process is a stochastic process generating
some structure in the noise produced with respect to the frequency, intensity and other
parameters.
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Real world channel can have different characteristics which can mostly be discussed in
the context of the kind of noise present on the channel. The channel can have the following
kinds of noise
1. Pure white and Gaussian
2. Partially colored and white Gaussian
3. Pure colored
It would not be practical to assume that the noise is white noise as it as an impossi-
ble idealization of noise with a bandwidth much greater than that of the signal of interest.
On the other hand, using purely colored noise is also not very useful as it renders itself to
complex mathematical treatment and also not encountered in everyday processes. Using
colored noise in analysis would ask one to incorporate the difficulties present with oper-
ating on the data for the inadequate presence of high-frequency components which would
require being well behaved. The difficulties reflect themselves in application of integra-
tion or differentiation of these noise processes which would require delving into deeper
mathematics and might not be that consequential.
In the real world, we have to deal with this aberration in the mathematical models.
In our experience with Power-line channel, we find it is a combination of colored noise
and white Gaussian noise. The colored nature of the noise primarily shows up due to the
presence of various devices which emanate frequency at the switching frequency of the
adapters and this spillage of energy is not uniform.
The adversary employed in PowerLine Whisperer knows that it is colored noise. The
deniability argument for an AWGN channel will still work in this scenario. Borrowing
from the proof, the changes in colored noise are due to the presence of high variability in
the noise leading to high frequency components. This causes problems in the calculating
the higher order derivatives on the model of the data captured from the channel.
21
The following hint might strictly apply on continuos domain signal, one can think about
the intuition from the Taylor’s series expansion [20], of the function, that it will not be
possible to compute higher order derivatives of the captured data when it is sampled from
colored noise. f(b) = f(a) + f ′(a)(b− a) + . . .+ f
(n)(u)
n!




where f (n)(x) denotes the nth derivative of f(x), and ε satisfies the relation a ≤ ε ≤ b.
An elegant argument for the proof to apply on non-AWGN channel is to decompose
the colored noise channel into narrow frequency ranges which can be approximated to be






The need for private communications is perhaps greater than ever before. People have long
needed to keep the communications among themselves private, but, increasingly, they may
want to conceal not only the messages that they exchange, but also with whom they are
communicating—or even the fact that they are communicating at all. This latter type of
communication is said to be not only confidential and anonymous, but also deniable, in
the sense that despite exchanging messages, participants can plausibly deny that any such
exchanges ever took place.
In this paper, we consider scenarios where people congregate in common public spaces
and want to communicate with others in that same space, yet wish to keep their communi-
cations both confidential and deniable. We call such a message exchange a deniable liaison.
Moreover, it may be the case that one or more parties to the communication wish to remain
anonymous. Consider, for example, a covert message exchange between a spy and her han-
dler in a coffee shop, a whistleblower in an office environment, or a group of activists who
wish to covertly organize a public protest. These scenarios require local communication
that is confidential, anonymous, and deniable.
Covert agents have long employed a wide range of techniques in these scenarios, but
they tend to be either limited in bandwidth (e.g., a necessarily brief, clandestine conversa-
tion) or interactivity (e.g., a “dead drop” of a physical message or storage device). Indeed,
any real-world interaction bears some risk of observation, and most are not readily applica-
ble to broadcast scenarios. Hence, a variety of anonymous electronic communications sys-
tems have emerged to provide important—and often widely used—communications chan-
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nels, but most focus primarily on wide-area communications (e.g., Tor [1], which supports
communications between Internet-connected end hosts that are often separated by great
distances) where deniability can sometimes be provided by hiding in a very large crowd of
Internet citizens. In the circumstances we consider, a wide-area anonymous communica-
tion system not only introduces unnecessary complexity and latency, but exposes the parties
to additional risk by requiring them to send their messages over the wide-area Internet. We
argue that such schemes are not always available due to the widespread Internet arms race
of blocking such services and instead a powerful local scheme can be used which leverages
the broadcast nature of wireless communication. We argue that these settings call instead
for an anonymous, confidential, deniable communications system for the local area that
takes advantage of communications devices that users already own (e.g., laptops, smart-
phones, tablets), without requiring that covert messages traverse the wide-area Internet.
We introduce DenaLi, a lightweight communications system to support deniable li-
aisons. DenaLi makes it possible for parties to exchange messages with one another in
a local setting, without ever exposing with whom they are communicating, or even the
fact that they communicated with a local party at all. Our system takes advantage of the
ubiquitous deployment of 802.11 wireless communications networks and, in particular, the
pervasive nature of corrupted frames on these networks. Frame corruption is a common
phenomenon that inevitably results from a variety of factors, ranging from colliding trans-
missions to a noisy communications medium. Traditionally, corrupted frames are viewed
as a source of inefficiency, as they require the sender to retransmit the original frame; yet,
in our case, they provide an opportunity to hide communications. DenaLi creates spuri-
ous corrupt frames by injecting covert messages into frames carrying cover traffic directed
toward innocuous destinations. Since these frames are indeed corrupt, they will not be
forwarded by the access point to their apparent destination. Instead, other nodes in the
WiFi network that overhear the frame and posses the appropriate secret key can extract and
decrypt the injected payload.
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DenaLi is conceptually simple, and achieving anonymity and confidentiality is easy
enough—any reasonable encryption technique will suffice. The challenges entail designing
the communications channel so that the resulting stream of corrupted frames is deniable,
which requires both understanding (and modeling) the properties of bit errors in an 802.11
wireless communications channel and appropriately modeling the attacker. To do so, we
build on previous work that studies bit-error characteristics in the wireless medium, and
perform our own measurements to understand these error characteristics in various settings
and for different encodings. We develop a modified 802.11 wireless driver that modulates
the covert message over a stream of cover traffic in such a way that the resulting sequence of
corrupted frames mimics the existing pattern of corruption in the wireless channel. DenaLi
traffic matches naturally occurring wireless corruption both in terms of the frequency of
corrupted frames and the bit positions within the frames that are corrupted.
DenaLi provides deniability in a setting where an adversary can observe wireless com-
munications in the local area, but cannot get very close to the suspected sender. An adver-
sary who observes transmissions sufficiently close to the sender could infer the presence
of a hidden message channel due to the (relatively) high level of packet corruption near
the point of transmission. We envision that in typical cases an adversary would not be
targeting an individual sender but would rather only be in a position to monitor a group
of users (e.g., in the midst of a larger group, perhaps close to the access point). In these
cases, we demonstrate through empirical measurements that distinguishing DenaLi trans-
missions from naturally occurring corrupted wireless frames can be made arbitrarily diffi-
cult for message rates that can easily support the exchange of short covert messages. We
show through extensive controlled experiments with real wireless chipsets that when we
closely match the frame error rate and bit error distributions of the existing wireless chan-
nel, DenaLi achieves a bit error distribution pattern that is indistinguishable from naturally
occurring errors. To achieve this level of deniability, throughput is quite low (sufficient for
exchanging only small messages or “tweets”), but the sender can, of course, accept less
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deniability in exchange for higher throughput, a tradeoff that we explore in our evaluation.
Traffic that the user is already sending as part of normal communication can provide the
necessary cover traffic, which means that DenaLi does not need to create additional cover
traffic but can rather hide its messages in the user’s existing traffic.
Our work presents several contributions. First, we recognize that the increasing need
for anonymous, deniable communications in settings where parties are physically close to
one another calls for a new class of communications tools. Second, we observe that in
these settings, the ubiquity of other WiFi communication (and the corresponding wireless
frame corruption) can serve as useful cover to conceal communications. Third, we define
the notion of deniability in this context and design a modulation scheme that achieves
deniability by matching the corruption properties of the deniable messages to that of the
cover traffic. Finally, we implement and evaluate a prototype system based on this design.
DenaLi’s design is inspired by Rivest’s proposal for chaffing and winnowing, whereby a
sender disguises the real message intended for the recipient by including additional “chaff”
on the same channel [49]. With knowledge of a shared secret, the recipient can identify and
discard the chaff, leaving only the message in question. Unlike Rivest, however, we further
encrypt the message to make it easier to efficiently inject into the chaff without disturbing
the statistical properties of the aggregate.
DenaLi is the first system to provide a point-to-point deniable communication channel
in a WiFi network using commodity hardware.
Section 4.2 defines our expected usage scenario and outlines our basic approach, threat
model, and design goals. Section 4.3 describes the design of the DenaLi communication
channel in detail. Section 4.4 describes our prototype implementations and explains the
changes we made to the wireless driver to enable DenaLi. We evaluate DenaLi in Sec-
tion 4.5, discuss limitations and future work in Section 4.6, and conclude in Section 4.7.
26
Figure 4.1: Basic communication setup.
4.2 Problem Description
We now explore the scenario where we believe that DenaLi is most likely to be used and the
threat model, in terms of the capabilities of a typical adversary who might try to discover
or thwart communication with DenaLi.
4.2.1 Usage Scenario and Basic Approach
DenaLi is designed for settings where the communicating parties are within wireless range
of one another and, hence, can hear one another’s wireless transmissions to a local access
point. We further presume that a DenaLi sender has some number of pre-existing con-
nections to innocuous destinations on the Internet which will provide cover traffic for our
covert communication channel. Figure 4.1 shows such a basic setup. An adversary may be
positioned anywhere in the wireless network and is able to eavesdrop on any transmissions
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by the participants. DenaLi does not employ or require link-layer encryption schemes (like
WEP or WPA) for its confidentiality guarantees.
In this scenario, the sender, Alice, sends traffic to her usual set of wide-area Internet
destinations via the access point. Due to the nature of the wireless channel, some frames
may experience corruption, and the access point will thus discard those frames. Alice will
subsequently retransmit these frames until they are successfully received by the AP and
forwarded on. But, if Alice and Bob share a secret, Alice can inject additional, deliberately
corrupt frames, such that the frames corrupted by the wireless channel serve as chaff to
conceal the fact that some of the corrupt frames contain a hidden message. If Alice and
Bob share a secret, Bob can determine which corrupted frames are chaff and can retain
only those corrupted frames that contain the hidden message.
Corrupt frames naturally result from various wireless effects, including low signal-to-
noise ratio (SNR), broadband interference, hidden terminals, and multi-path fading, which
depend on the relative position of the transmitting device and nearby wireless devices,
materials of nearby objects, and other unknown factors. Because the causes of corruption
are diverse and time-varying, detecting the hidden messages with certainty requires either
knowledge of the secret, or the ability to monitor frame corruption rates and compare the
measured distribution to the corruption rates that would be expected as a function of both
space and time.
To construct a profile that closely matches that of a normal wireless channel, we exploit
two important observations about the corruption of packets in a broadcast medium, partic-
ularly the 802.11 protocol. First, packet errors in packets occur in chunks of bytes [50], not
as individual bits; most of the chunks of errors are about 400 bits, and occurrence of larger
chunks of errors is not very usual. This phenomenon might occur as a result of interference,
or the loss of synchronization. The second observation is that the bit errors inside wireless
frames have specific patterns [51]; for example, bits that are farther from the start of the
frame will experience an increasing probability of corruption.
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4.2.2 Threat Model
The adversary’s primary goal is to detect the presence of hidden communication on a shared
wireless medium. If the adversary is able to further determine which transmitted frames
contain hidden communication, it may be able to use existing techniques to determine the
identity of the sender [52]. The adversary’s main capability is to listen to wireless frames
within its radio range.
We assume that the adversary has finite computation resources and a finite number of
nodes that it can use to monitor the wireless channel. In our prototype, we assume the
adversary has only one node with which it can monitor and has knowledge of at least one
party which may be communicating using DenaLi. In a practical scenario, the adversary
might know the identity of the sender but not his MAC address. He would still have to
scan the channel and apply techniques to identify the sender’s device, which might be
hard in dense public places where signal strength of device varies considerably due to the
commotion [53]. If the adversary has previous knowledge about which parties may be
using DenaLi to communicate, it could position its radio(s) close to one of the senders
and attempt to determine if the sender’s wireless interface was sending corrupted frames
at a rate that exceeds the typical rate at which a wireless radio emits corrupted frames.
We assume that the adversary remains at a sufficient distance that it cannot conclusively
determine that some frames are already corrupt when they are transmitted by the sender;
rather, it can only monitor the frame corruption rate. As long as the adversary is sufficiently
far away, the sender can always make his channel worse by staying far away from the public
access point, thereby legitimately retransmitting at a higher rate than normal.
Even without knowledge of communicating parties, a stronger adversary can monitor
and collect wireless transmissions from multiple independent locations in the network and
run statistical analysis on the collection of captured traffic. In these cases, the adversary
might be able to determine that the profile of bit-error corruption for certain nodes in the
network does not match the corruption profile for other senders, or that the frame corrup-
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tion profile does not change with increasing distance from the sender as one might expect.
Such an adversary might be able to perform an analysis of error patterns with a tool such
as Jigsaw [54], but even with the benefit of multiple observation points, if the distributions
are matched appropriately, the perturbations that DenaLi introduces should still provide
deniability for senders. Moreover, a global adversary, i.e., one that can monitor at multi-
ple locations in the wireless network—but not the sender or receiver—does not necessarily
have a better chance at detecting the presence of hidden communication than a local ad-
versary who only has one monitoring point. Although the ability to observe transmissions
at multiple locations provides the opportunity to observe corruption patterns of the same
packet at multiple locations, these observations still do not allow the adversary to ascertain
what bit errors would look like at the exact sender and receiver locations [55]. Previous
work suggests that bit error patterns within corrupted frames will differ depending on the
adversary’s location [56].
In our empirical evaluations and security analysis (Section 4.5), we assume an adver-
sary who can observe all the corrupted frames from a single location in the network. We
note that even if an adversary targets a particular sender (e.g., based on previous knowl-
edge), the sender can always move away from a suspected adversary or maintain enough
mobility to reduce the likelihood of being monitored at close range. (Indeed, previous work
shows that simply rotating the communication device can dramatically impact the channel
quality [53].) Therefore, we believe that it is extremely unlikely that an adversary could
successfully target a sender and successfully monitor the sender at close enough range for
an extended period of time without tipping off the sender.
4.2.3 Design Goals
We aim to develop a covert channel with a variety of properties, in addition to the standard
properties of confidentiality and covertness. Undetectability says that the adversary cannot
detect the presence of any messages. Deniability is a slightly weaker property that says
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that even if the channel is detectable, the adversary cannot determine with non-negligible
probability that a particular user or group of users is exchanging messages. Unlinkability
says that an adversary may be able to detect the presence of communications, but cannot
link the sender of a message with its receiver. Robustness says that the adversary should
not be able to disrupt the channel.
DenaLi technically does not achieve strict undetectability, since the process of sending
a message does perturb the wireless channel from its original state. We design the resulting
bit error profile to be statistically similar to a normal profile, however, making it difficult
for an adversary to determine with certainty that the channel has been perturbed. Because
frame corruption is a random process that is itself based on a non-stationary distribution
(e.g., it is affected by a variety of factors, ranging from the presence of other senders, to
changes in obstructions such as people and doors, to the user’s wireless radio, to physical
properties of the air), we can perturb the corruption profile of the channel without allowing
the adversary to determine that a sender is definitely sending a hidden message. In this
way, we achieve deniability.
Independently, DenaLi achieves unlinkability because even if the adversary could detect
the presence of additional corrupted frames, without having the key that Alice and Bob
share, the adversary cannot determine that Bob is the intended recipient of the additional
corrupted frames. In fact, by having multiple participants share a group key, DenaLi can
be used to surreptitiously broadcast a hidden message.
Finally, DenaLi achieves practical robustness by virtue of the fact that an adversary
cannot easily selectively disrupt the communication of the wireless frames containing the
hidden message. An adversary could jam the entire wireless channel, but doing so would
disrupt communication for legitimate traffic as well.
DenaLi does not rely on 802.11 encryption standards such as WEP and WPA to achieve
confidentiality, as we assume that many adversaries may be powerful enough to either (1)
join the channel with a known WEP or WPA2 keys (e.g., in the case where the adversary
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Figure 4.2: Injection of additional corrupted frames via a virtual network interface (imple-
mented as a Linux TUN device).
is the network administrator, such as in a public square or a coffee shop); or (2) break the
WEP encryption or WPA2 encryption using known techniques. Instead, DenaLi provides
confidentiality by encrypting the message contents before injecting them into the corrupted
frames.
4.3 Communications Channel
This section describes the DenaLi design in more detail. The basic approach is for the
sender to inject corrupted frames into an existing encrypted application traffic stream (the
chaff), so that in the air, the adversary sees a single stream of encrypted application traffic
with non-corrupted and corrupted frames. The goal is to make what is seen on the air
appear as a plausible sequence of frames to the purported destination to anyone observing
the traffic pattern. To do so, the sender occasionally duplicates existing frames and corrupts
them by injecting a portion of the message to be communicated. The sender and receiver
must also develop a common means to identify which corrupted frames contain hidden
messages, and where (i.e., at what byte offset) within a corrupted frame the hidden message
lies.
4.3.1 Basic Mechanism: Frame Injection
DenaLi constructs corrupted frames and hides the corrupted frames among a larger stream
of frames being transmitted to the access point. Some of these frames (perhaps including
some of DenaLi’s constructed frames) will be corrupted by the wireless channel. In order
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to make it more difficult to determine which corrupted frames contain embedded messages,
DenaLi transmits hidden messages only in frames that otherwise are part of encrypted SSL
connections (e.g., to popular websites like Gmail). We chose to use SSL connections as
the basis for DenaLi’s cover traffic because the encrypted payload of these frames acts as
a one-time pad into which we can embed similarly encrypted messages without obviously
disturbing their statistical properties.
An SSL frame will necessarily have a TCP header, which DenaLi uses to compute the
offset into the frame at which to place the embedded message. Because bits that are lo-
cated further into a frame (i.e., with a greater offset) have a greater chance of experiencing
corruption [51], DenaLi skews the probability distributions on injecting message blocks to
favor corrupting bits farther into the frame. Obviously, the message must be (substantially)
smaller than the frame into which it is being injected. Our implementation exports a virtual
network interface with a small MTU, which ensures that the covert channel is automati-
cally broken into smaller message blocks. Figure 4.2 illustrates the communication tunnel
between the sender and receiver, including how the hidden message is combined with chaff
before being transmitted over the air; the receiver hears all of the wireless traffic but can
discard the chaff before passing the message to the receiver.
Figure 4.3 shows the construction of the combined packet stream in more detail. The
hidden message is passed through the virtual network interface (a Linux TUN device),
whereupon it is combined with a copy of an existing frame from the chaff via bit-error
injection. The corrupted frame is then transmitted very close in time to the unmodified
chaff frame. To decode the hidden message, the receiver performs the reverse of this pro-
cess. Ideally, the entire stream would be transmitted via the same outgoing interface, but
limitations of current wireless chipsets prevented us from implementing the transmitter in
this fashion; Section 4.4 discusses these limitations in more detail, and Section 4.6 explains
how we conceal the presence of two separate transmitting interfaces.
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Figure 4.3: Process of injecting corrupted frames at the sender; the receiver performs the
reverse of this process.
4.3.2 Communication Protocol
Figure 4.4 shows the steps that are involved in exchanging messages in a two-party message
exchange. We now explain these steps in detail.
Establishing a shared session key The sender and receiver use the DenaLi channel to
establish a shared session key in a manner that is analogous to how session keys are es-
tablished in many protocols. In case of DenaLi, the colluding parties should be aware of
that they are in proximity of each other and then instantiate the key exchange process. The
sender generates a session key and encrypts the key with the receiver’s public key. It then
sends the resulting ciphertext over the DenaLi channel, taking the resulting ciphertext and
embedding it as corrupted bits in an outgoing sequence of frames. The receiver decodes
the message from the corrupted frames to retrieve the session key. The session key is trans-
mitted on the DenaLi channel just as any other message would be, except that the initial
transmission and encoding is based on the receiver’s public key, instead of the session key
itself. All transmissions on the DenaLi channel involve a process of the sender encoding
the hidden message and the receiver decoding it upon receipt, as described below.
Encoding and transmitting First, the sender obtains a cover frame by duplicating a
frame that is about to go out of its wireless interface as part of an existing connection.
It then corrupts this duplicate by injecting data from the covert channel. Before injecting
the hidden message into a corrupted frame, the sender: (1) encrypts the hidden message
with the shared session key (or, in the case of the initial key exchange, the receiver’s public
key) using CBC-AES 256-bit symmetric key encryption; (2) computes the offset into the
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Figure 4.4: Steps involved in exchanging messages using corrupted frames.
frame where the message should be inserted; and (3) computes an HMAC over the message
ciphertext. The sender then inserts bits corresponding to the hidden message length, the
HMAC, and the hidden message itself as a block into the corrupted frame. We describe the
process of computing the frame offset and the HMAC below.
In addition to the session key, the sender uses the TCP sequence number and acknowl-
edgment number as salts to compute the frame offset for the hidden message. Doing so
helps randomize the offset, so that the inserted bits are not always in the same location in
the corrupted frame; randomizing the offset makes it difficult for an adversary who is eaves-
dropping to ascertain the presence of a hidden message, since the location of the corrupted
bits that contain the hidden message will be different for each packet. We considered using
a pseudo-random number generator with an initial seed to allow the sender and receiver
to compute this offset; the problem in doing so is that if any corrupted frame containing
a hidden message is lost, reordered, or itself corrupted, the receiver and sender will lose
synchronization. Instead, DenaLi uses the output of a public cryptographic hash function
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that uses the TCP sequence number, acknowledgment number, and shared secret (or, in the
case of the initial key exchange, the receiver’s public key) as the input for computing the
offset. Thus, all of the information that the receiver needs to extract the hidden message
from the frame is present in the frame itself. Unless the adversary has the shared secret, it
cannot determine the offset of the artificially corrupted burst sequence.
Because the injected frame is corrupt (i.e., its layer-two checksum is invalid), the re-
ceiver no longer has an inherent way to determine the integrity of the frame—or, more
specifically, the embedded DenaLi message within—it receives. In lieu of the (now cor-
rupted) frame checksum, a DenaLi sender also includes an HMAC computed over the hid-
den message contents that is keyed on the session key, the TCP sequence number, and the
acknowledgment. The message’s HMAC is prepended to the hidden message before the
resulting bits are inserted into the frame.
The astute reader might observe two nuances about the way that the sender embeds
the message into a corrupted frame. First, the message length is included “in the clear”.
Including the message length in the clear is necessary because the number of bits corre-
sponding to the hidden message varies (both by design to make detection more difficult,
and as a natural result of the original message sizes). Because both the value of the mes-
sage length and the offset within the frame where the bits indicating the message length
vary per-frame, recognizing a pattern would be difficult. A sender could, of course, intro-
duce more entropy into the message length value by randomizing the block size for each
block that it injects into a corrupted frame, making it essentially impossible to identify the
presence of the message length value, at the expense of channel throughput.
Second, all of the corrupted bits are injected into the frame as a single block rather than
interspersed at random bit locations throughput the packet. Previous work has established
that wireless bit errors tend to occur as corrupted blocks [50], not as individual corrupted
bits. Additionally, because the DenaLi sender injects ciphertext into other ciphertext (i.e.,
the SSL stream that serves as the chaff), interspersing the block throughput the packet does
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Figure 4.5: Checking the integrity of received hidden messages.
not increase covertness: Because both the hidden message and the chaff are encrypted,
the adversary can see that the frame is corrupted, but has no straightforward way of deter-
mining the bit positions corresponding to the corruption, unless he has the corresponding
uncorrupted version of the frame. Injecting an encrypted message into SSL payload makes
the likelihood of every bit to be corrupted to be ≈ 0.5.
Receiving and decoding To receive the hidden message, the receiver polls the wireless
medium for all the corrupted frames and attempts to decode and decrypt the bits in each
corrupted frame that are located at the appropriate offset, which is computed as a function
of both the session key and the TCP sequence number and acknowledgment numbers in the
packet header. The receiver can apply the same function to determine the appropriate offset
of the message in the corrupted frame to extract the ciphertext and decrypt it to recover the
session key, which will be used to encrypt future messages and as an input for computing
the frame offsets.
Upon hearing a corrupted frame in the wireless medium, the receiver extracts the grain
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Figure 4.6: Processing of an 802.11 wireless frame at the host, and the two modifications
that we make to enable DenaLi: (1) setting the number of retransmissions to zero through
the SoftMAC implementation; (2) disabling the frame checksum computation to allow the
interface to transmit the corrupted frame.
from the chaff by computing the offset where the hidden message is expected (as a function
of the key and the TCP sequence and acknowledgment numbers contained in the frame) on
every corrupted frame, extracting the bits that should correspond to the hidden message,
computing the HMAC on the decoded and decrypted message, and comparing it with the
HMAC value present in the packet. The receiver computes the HMAC of the decoded mes-
sage and compares it to the value of HMAC included in the packet, which (as mentioned
above) is prepended to the transmitted message before being injected into the frame. If the
HMAC is correct, the receiver then proceeds to decode and decrypt the hidden message. (It
is extremely unlikely that the bits of the secret message and the HMAC will be corrupted
simultaneously in such a way that the HMAC calculated over the corrupted frame will be
the same as the corrupted value of the included HMAC.) Figure 4.5 illustrates this process.
4.4 Prototype Implementation
In this section, we describe a prototype implementation [57] of DenaLi using off-the-shelf
wireless chipsets based on the design detailed in Section 4.3.
4.4.1 The TUN Interface
In the interest of simplicity, our prototype implementation of DenaLi provides a TUN inter-
face that allows applications to use the covert channel just as any other network interface. It
is a virtual interface in Linux, implemented as a TUNnel device, to exchange packets with
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user space. A user can determine how to design and implement applications that commu-
nicate over the channel, or just use existing ones. Once a packet is transmitted on the TUN
interface, DenaLi encrypts it (including the headers and checksums), calculates the HMAC
of the encrypted message, computes the resulting message length, and concatenates them
to arrive at the bit sequence that is ultimately inserted into a corrupt wireless frame. We
compute the HMAC using SHA-256.
4.4.2 Dual Wireless Interfaces
Most existing wireless chipsets calculate the layer-two checksum, also known as the frame
check sequence (FCS), in hardware. Hence, even the “corrupted” frames created by in-
jecting the encrypted payload would normally be sent out with a correct FCS, meaning the
destination of the encapsulating chaff frame (i.e., the access point) would receive the packet
and attempt to process it. While the IP checksum would still likely be incorrect, it is far
less common for an IP checksum to be invalid on purportedly correctly received frames,
destroying DenaLi’s deniability.
Hence, we must ensure that the corrupted frame is transmitted with an invalid FCS.
Unfortunately, the current architectures of most wireless chipsets do not expose an inter-
face to manipulate the FCS. Instead, our prototype uses a wireless interface card with the
Atheros AR9485 chipset, which exports a register that disables the calculation of the FCS
(we are unaware of other vendors that provide this feature). Atheros ath9k and ath5k se-
ries of chipsets provide this feature available commercially for Linux [58]. The register
setting is not selective, however: if enabled, all packets are transmitted without a proper
FCS. Hence, in order to transmit the chaff traffic, our prototype employs two wireless in-
terfaces: one to transmit the chaff SSL traffic, and one to transmit the additional corrupted
frames that contain the hidden message with a corrupted FCS. We are using two wireless
cards to facilitate usability of the prototype, as software defined radios are bulky and hard
to carry for general purpose use by non-technical person. We use identical Acer Aspire
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One laptops with Intel Celeron processor running at 800 MHz, with Linux 3.2.0 and stable
compat-wireless networking stack.
4.4.3 Driver Modifications and SoftMAC
Each wireless frame passes through multiple stages before it is transmitted, many of which
occur in hardware by default (and, hence, are inherently challenging to modify), as shown
in Figure 4.6. The specific stages depend on the architecture of the particular wireless
chipset in use, although we provide a rough general outline that many chipsets follow.
First, an application provides the payload to the operating system, which in turn copies
the data to driver memory after adding 802.11 MAC header. The driver then encrypts the
packet and transmits it; the encryption keys are retained in software, but the encryption
process itself occurs in hardware. The transmission control unit manages the fine-grained
timing of 802.11, including generating the frame checksum right before transmitting the
frame.
Our DenaLi prototype makes two changes to the default processing pipeline: it (1) dis-
ables the FCS checksum; and (2) disables the retransmission of these frames, which ob-
viously will never generate link-layer acknowledgments. Figure 4.6 illustrates where we
made these modifications in the NIC processing pipeline.
To modify the behavior of the wireless interface, we use the SoftMAC 802.11 wireless
MAC implementation [59], which offloads many functions of the wireless driver to the
kernel subsystem, thus forming a clean interface with various vender drivers and allowing
us to modify various parts of the process.
4.5 Security and Performance
In this section, we evaluate the security of DenaLi relative to the performance that it
achieves. As discussed in Section 4.2, our primary goals for security are deniability and
confidentiality, where deniability says that the resulting traffic is statistically indistinguish-
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able from network traffic that does not contain any hidden message. We begin with a dis-
cussion of the characteristics of the resulting wireless traffic that should appear statistically
indistinguishable to an adversary. We then formalize our definition of security in terms of
the indistinguishability of the resulting DenaLi traffic from ordinary wireless frame corrup-
tion.
We conduct real-world experiments with our prototype implementation to explore the
tradeoffs between deniability and throughput over the DenaLi channel. Across all of our
experiments, our prototype consumes an average of 2% and maximum of 5% CPU time
at both transmitter and receiver while it injects or decodes corrupted wireless frames. We
confirm that no packets are dropped by kernel or socket buffers despite using the pcap
library for packet reception and injection.
4.5.1 Traffic Characteristics
Detecting DenaLi communication requires the adversary to make observations about per-
turbations to the natural error patterns at one of two levels: packet errors in the medium, or
patterns of bit errors within individual frames.
The packet error rate is the fraction of transmitted frames in the wireless medium that
are corrupt. This rate depends on the characteristics and nature of the environment where
the colluding parties (and the adversary) are located. Although the instantaneous frame
error rate cannot be modeled precisely because the type and frequency of events that cause
interference or frame loss are inherently random, we can calculate the rate of corruption of
the frames in a live capture of a collected packet trace and attempt to mimic that distribu-
tion. DenaLi users maintain statistics regarding the packet error rate of normal frames so
that they can inject corrupted frames in a way that mimics the naturally occurring packet
corruption in the current environment. In channels that are subject to corruption rates that
are higher or more variable, DenaLi participants can inject hidden messages with higher
frequency. We explore the relationship between the amount of noise in the channel and the
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throughput that we can achieve later in Section 4.5.3.
The bit error distribution is the distribution of the bit errors in specific positions within a
corrupted frame. An adversary who captures the frames may analyze the corrupted frames
to compare the error patterns. We modify the contents of the intentionally corrupted frame
in such a manner that it is difficult to differentiate actually corrupted bits from the crafted
corrupted frame. Our goal is to inject bit errors into packets in such a way that the resulting
distribution of bit errors resembles a bit-error pattern that would result from the corrup-
tion of one or more symbols in an encoded wireless packet. The exact bit-error pattern
is difficult to model because these patterns depend on how the sender modulates packets.
In lieu of conducting additional experiments on bit error rates ourselves, we follow the
assumptions from the Maranello study [50], which suggests that the bit errors in a frame
occur in chunks, due to the loss of synchronization between the sender and receiver or the
bursty nature of interference in the wireless channel, unlike uniform corruption of bits in
the whole frame. In our evaluation, we use DenaLi to corrupt specific bit error patterns
in such a way that mimics these observed distributions. We also note that the farther that
the sender is from the adversary, the more likely that the adversary will observe naturally
occurring frame corruption, which should make it more difficult to distinguish naturally
occurring corruption from artificial corruption.
4.5.2 Security Goal
The security of DenaLi requires that: (1) sending a hidden message using DenaLi creates
a perturbation of the wireless channel’s packet error rate and bit error distribution that is
statistically indistinguishable from if a DenaLi message had not been sent (deniability);
(2) the adversary cannot recover the messages (confidentiality). As the confidentiality of
DenaLi relies on the strength of existing encryption technologies, we focus on defining and
evaluating DenaLi’s deniability properties.
Consider an adversary who observes the properties of the wireless channel from a par-
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(a) The bit-error distribution from the perspective of the DenaLi sender, given a 23 KB message and
a 70-byte TUN MTU.


















(b) Natural bit error distribution.


















(c) The bit error distribution after the DenaLi perturbation from (a) is added.
Figure 4.7: Bit-error distribution in an injected DenaLi frame at the sender, and bit error
distributions as viewed at a monitor, with and without injected DenaLi frames.
ticular location. The adversary can empirically measure both the packet error rate for a
sequence of frames, and the bit error distributions within each corrupted frame. Suppose
that the adversary has two packet traces P and P ′, where P is a packet trace without De-
naLi communication and P ′ is a trace with DenaLi communication. Deniability says that
the adversary cannot determine which trace has DenaLi communication with probability
greater than 1/2 + ε. If the adversary can correctly detect the presence of a covert channel
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with probability greater than 1/2 + ε, then the adversary wins.
Similarly, suppose also that the adversary runs a maximum likelihood detector based on
observations of bit error distributions in corrupted frames to detect the presence of a DenaLi
channel based on deviations in the respective distributions. According to the definition of
deniability above, if ε is zero, the best threshold that an adversary could design would
be unable to distinguish the two distributions of bit error patterns drawn from P and P ′.
The ε parameter measures the extent to which the two distributions do not overlap. We
quantify the degree to which the two distributions do not overlap (which corresponds to the
probability that the adversary succeeds) using the Pearson correlation coefficient between
the two distributions [60]. ε is simply half times one minus the correlation coefficient.
Formally, we denote the bit error distribution from packet trace P ′ as f ′(x), where x is the
bit position in the packet; similarly, the normal bit error distribution from packet trace P
is f(x). For each of the distributions that are parameterized by frame error rate and bytes
injected per frame, we compare the two distributions as follows:
ε = 1/2− cov(f(x), f
′(x))
2σf(x)σf ′(x)
Note that we can make ε arbitrarily small: If DenaLi injects no bits from the hidden mes-
sage, the naturally occurring bit error distribution is unperturbed, and the two distributions
are indistinguishable, both by definition and by construction. Such a channel, of course,
is useless because its throughput is zero. Increasing the throughput of the hidden channel
by injecting additional corrupted frames and introducing bit errors that deviate from the
naturally occurring bit errors perturbs the underlying distribution. Thus, there is a trade-
off between the degree to which the bit error distribution is perturbed (i.e., the number of
bits from the hidden message that we inject into any corrupted frame) and the resulting
throughput.
The packet error rate also has a naturally occurring value that varies over time. Suppose
that for a given time interval i in packet trace P , the adversary observes a packet error rate
44
fi. Then, the adversary can observe a distribution F = {f1, f2, . . . , fn} and a correspond-
ing distribution F ′ for packet trace P ′. We say that the packet error rate induced by running
DenaLi achieves deniability if the adversary cannot succeed in distinguishing F and F ′
with a probability greater than 1/2 + ε. By defining ε according to the distance between
these two distributions, we can determine the number of corrupted packets that a DenaLi
sender can inject subject to an upper bound on ε. In principle, a DenaLi sender can detect
the average packet error rate for some time interval and transmit corrupted packets in a way
that tracks this packet error rate within some bound of ε. For the purposes of our evaluation,
we have fixed the packet error rate, but in practice it might vary. Because packet corrup-
tion is a local phenomenon that is erratic and unpredictable, fine-grained control over this
statistic may not be necessary or useful in practice.
4.5.3 Evaluating Deniability vs. Throughput
In this section, we evaluate the tradeoff between deniability and throughput of the DenaLi
channel using our prototype implementation. We first describe the experimental setup and
then present the results.
Experimental setup
We design an experiment with a sender, a receiver, and a single adversary. Each device is a
laptop, where the sender and receiver are configured as described in Section 4.4. The sender
generates cover traffic by browsing Gmail over a secure HTTP connection. The adversary
is a third laptop with a wireless interface card configured in monitor mode. We locate the
adversary in close proximity to the receiver, which, as we described in Section 4.2, is the
place where the adversary has the highest probability of detection. We assume that the
adversary has only a single monitor. Each node in the setup collects packet traces and
records the corresponding packet error rates and bit error distributions, allowing us to see
these statistics at the sender, receiver, and the adversary.
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Results
We first study the bit-error distributions that result from injecting chunks of hidden mes-
sages for a 70-byte MTU for the TUN device. Next, we study how this injected error
distribution looks when viewed from the adversary, modeled as a monitor located near
the receiver. Finally, to measure how throughput varies with deniability, we explore the
relationship between the throughput of the DenaLi channel and the Pearson correlation co-
efficient between the normal bit error distribution and perturbed bit error distribution as
seen at the adversary and the resulting throughput of the hidden message corresponding for
the corresponding perturbation.
Figure 4.7a shows the bit-error distribution that results from injecting about 23 KB of
a hidden message across a sequence of wireless frames, assuming a 70-byte MTU for the
TUN device. We choose this size for the TUN MTU because previous studies [50] have
shown that about 75% of corrupted packets have bit errors that are less than 400 bits, and a
70-byte MTU and 256-bit HMAC corrupts at most 100 bytes.
Figure 4.7b shows the original bit error distribution for chaff traffic, as viewed from
the monitor; Figure 4.7c shows a similar distribution after DenaLi has injected a hidden
message; as the figures show, the two distributions are essentially indistinguishable. For
such a configuration, given “chaff” traffic throughput of about 2 Mbps and a packet error
rate of every thousandth packet, DenaLi achieves a hidden message rate of about 6 bps.
Although the two bit error distributions are not identical, they are reasonably close to one
other. The Pearson correlation coefficient between these two distributions was 0.99801,
yielding an ε value on the order of 10−4. Part of the reason that the two distributions are so
close is the relatively low throughput that we have chosen for the DenaLi channel. In the
rest of this section, we further explore the tradeoff between the level of deniability that the
DenaLi channel provides and the throughput that it achieves.
Our goal in the first experiment was to demonstrate DenaLi’s ability to achieve deni-














Figure 4.8: ε vs. TUN MTU (i.e., injected frame size). We varied MTU sizes to achieve
different throughput. Large TUN MTU values result in larger ε values and are less deniable.
Table 4.1: Bit error rates, approximate corresponding packet error rates assuming 1500-
byte packets, and the resulting DenaLi throughput given a 70-byte TUN MTU. We test a
range of bit error rates that are observed in practice [61].




corruption so that the corruption is natural. Because the channel may further corrupt bits in
the frame, we are conservative in how we corrupt bits in the frame, which naturally restricts
throughput. We now explore how a sender can achieve higher throughput in exchange for
less deniability (i.e., a larger ε value). We inject one packet for every 10,000 frames of
cover traffic This packet injection rate which clearly limits the maximum throughput we
can achieve to (at most) 0.0001 of the throughput of the cover traffic, making the two dis-
tribution indistinguishable to the adversary. Figure 4.8 shows how ε varies as we increase
the TUN MTU (i.e., throughput of the DenaLi channel). Naturally, ε increases with MTU.
The throughput of the DenaLi channel is also directly proportional to both the throughput
at which the chaff traffic is being sent and the packet error rate.
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Finally, we study how the throughput of the DenaLi channel varies as we vary the packet
error rate. To explore a range of packet error rates, we draw from the range of bit error
rates reported in the PPR study [61] and convert these observed rates to the corresponding
packet error rates in this operating regime. For this experiment, we fix the MTU of the TUN
interface to 70 bytes and send SSL chaff traffic by uploading a large file to a Gmail server
while varying the packet injection rate (i.e., the rate at which we inject corrupted frames
containing hidden messages). Note that fixing the packet error rate and the MTU size is
a rough mechanism for controlling ε, since the deviation is controlled by the size of the
DenaLi block size (i.e., the TUN MTU). We then measure the corresponding throughput
(which is directly proportional to the throughput of the chaff traffic). Table 4.1 shows how
the throughput of the DenaLi channel varies with packet error rates for a range of operating
regimes. The channel efficiency is similar to previous experiments; as expected, the bitrate
of the channel increases as the channel noise increases, as a noisier channel affords more
opportunities to inject corrupted frames without deviating from “normal” packet corruption
profiles. We caution that although traffic rates appear faster, the increase comes at the cost
of deniability, as we showed in Figure 4.8.
4.6 Discussion
Here we discuss open issues, including both weaknesses with the current DenaLi design
and avenues for future research.
Coping with limited wireless bandwidth Our experiments show that the cover traffic
overhead for DenaLi is anywhere from about 10:1 (for high ε) to 100:1 (for low ε), de-
pending on the burst of errors introduced and the frequency of they are injected. In any
case, the amount of cover traffic required to achieve deniability is significant, and it may be
prohibitive in settings where users bear high data-usage costs or face usage caps. Although
the overhead of cover traffic is inherently necessary for systems such as DenaLi, it may be
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more inconvenient for our use cases, where users may be communicating over DenaLi on
wireless networks that are not that well-provisioned in the first place (e.g., coffee shops,
public squares). We intend to conduct more experiments in these types of settings to bet-
ter understand the tradeoffs between the overhead that typical users would face and the
deniability that they would need to achieve.
Analysis of bitrate adaptation algorithms In this paper, we have ignored the topic of
bitrate selection. 802.11 devices have multiple bitrates to chose from, and some senders
will decrease their bitrate when they encounter poor frame reception rates, hence corrupt
frames may be transmitted at different rates than the eventually successfully received copy.
In our prototype, we transmit corrupted frames at 1 Mbps. This is due to the limitation of
commodity hardware as the chipset does not allow different transmission data rates. An
adversary might profile the bitrates of the corrupted frames to discover anomalous bitrate
adaptation patterns. The particular fallback rate(s) are determined by algorithm imple-
mented by the driver at the sender, which might be vendor specific. For softmac drivers in
the Linux distribution, the rate algorithm is Minstrel, and the fallback rates can be config-
ured in the frame’s transmit descriptor. This might be a problem if DenaLi is deployed in
peer-to-peer wireless network and high operation might bring down the overall throughput
of the wireless network. We still think future wireless drivers might support all different
rates in debug modes.
Timing attacks The adversary could perform more sophisticated timing attacks to dis-
cover a sender who is using DenaLi. Under ordinary circumstances, when a sender trans-
mits a corrupted frame, the sender should follow that frame with a retransmission and
ultimately receive a corresponding link-layer acknowledgment. Our implementation may
not give rise to retransmissions within the appropriate time bounds; in particular, in the
worst case, an adversary might see the corrupted frame and the retransmission within a
very short time interval (possibly even simultaneously). This limitation results because of
49
DenaLi’s implementation on an off-the-shelf wireless chipset which constrain how we can
modify the behavior of the wireless MAC. A software radio platform such as Sora [62]
could be used to build a system that ensures that duplicate corrupted frames always pre-
cede the corresponding non-corrupted frame and link-layer acknowledgment, but such a
prototype would not be as immediately deployable as DenaLi.
Transport Users can build two-way communication reliability using TCP or application-
layer acknowledgements. Denali provides a decoupled virtual interface which gives De-
naLi users freedom to choose. The attacker can mount DDoS attack by replaying corrupted
packet traces, but we can see that DenaLi does not have a high overhead on commodity lap-
tops. Also, the underlying encrypted hidden messages might arrive out of order, requiring
a transport-layer protocol like TCP.
Smartphones Our current prototype implementation of DenaLi was implemented on
Linux laptops, but a likely deployment scenario for DenaLi might be on smartphones (e.g.,
where citizens, operatives, or soldiers in a common area are coordinating and may only
have small personal devices). In some of these areas, we might expect 802.11 WiFi de-
ployments, in which case porting DenaLi to mobile devices might suffice. In some cases,
802.11 access points may not be deployed, in which case deniable communication might
need to depend on some other wireless communication medium (e.g., cellular, bluetooth).
Current smartphones equipped with Snapdragon processors have clock cycles up to 1 GHz,
which is powerful enough to process DenaLi packets.
Multi-hop wireless networks DenaLi currently operates only where the sender and re-
cipient are within radio range of one another (i.e., typically on the same wireless LAN). Al-
though we believe that there are significant opportunities for using DenaLi in these settings,
additional deployment opportunities exist in multi-hop wireless mesh networks, many of
which are now explicitly being deployed for the express purpose of Internet freedom [63].
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In these settings, DenaLi might still be used to deniably pass messages between each pair
of participants (i.e., it could form the “link layer” anonymous communication protocol), but
applying DenaLi to a mesh network setting is less straightforward. First, doing so would
involve constructing an overlay network of participants to relay the message, where the
relays would be chosen both according to the level of trust for each participant, as well
as their (rough) geographic location. Participants may also have to re-inject hidden mes-
sages into newly corrupted packets at each hop to avoid intersection attacks; doing so is not
straightforward, since the intermediate hops may not possess the key to decode the hidden
message.
Mobile Adversaries DenaLi can be identified by an adversary which can fingerprint dif-
ferent wireless chipsets with hardware differences and tolerances built in them. This would
be an analysis at the physical layer/ RF spectrum. This can happen when the adversary is
very close to the transmission. We acknowlege such limitation in the current implementa-
tion. This can change if the wifi-chipset architecture does not ask the registers values to be
burned at compile-time and only one chipset is used which allows to change the value of
register at run-time.
Analysis of FEC Current implementation of DenaLi injects random FEC value in the
link-layer checksum. It does not have control on the errors it can introduce on the 4 bytes
of FEC which can be exploited by the adversary to detect it. This is the limitation of current
Atheros chipset which generates the FEC while the frame is in transmission over the air.
This is to meet timing constraints of the protocol. We think the future implementations
might provide to inject a different value with improvements in the speeds of chip circuits.
4.7 Summary
Citizens of the world have an increasing need to achieve private communications in public
spaces. Unfortunately, public meetings are observable, and users who are communicating
51
with one another may need more covert means of exchanging messages when they are in
close proximity. In many cases, users may wish to hide the fact that they are communicating
in the first place. We suggest that parties who are near one another should take advantage
of packet corruption in wireless networks to provide cover for their communications. To do
so, we develop DenaLi, a lightweight deniable communications system that allows parties
to exchange messages in a local setting, without exposing the fact that they are communi-
cating. We take advantage of the ubiquitous nature of 802.11 “WiFi” networks to construct
a covert communications channel, using corrupted packets as the “chaff” to hide commu-
nications between parties.
We have designed and implemented DenaLi using real end hosts and commodity wire-
less interface cards, demonstrating that such a system is practical. Our experiments explore
the tradeoff between the deniability of the communications (i.e., the extent to which the pro-
file of packet corruption matches “normal” corruption characteristics) and the throughput
that the user can achieve when sending hidden messages. Like many anonymous commu-
nications systems, DenaLi requires significant communications overhead in terms of the





While encrypted communication becomes increasingly commonplace, end-to-end encryp-
tion may not be sufficient to ensure complete privacy for certain types of communication.
In contrast to cryptographic systems, which aim to protect the confidentiality or integrity
of communications, we focus on a different problem: concealing the presence of communi-
cation. In communication systems that are designed to achieve confidentiality, third party
may nonetheless be able to detect and prove the existence of communication, even if it is
not possible to decipher the communications. Communications based on Cryptographic
primitives operate on restrictions imposed on the computational power of the adversary
while relaxing assumptions on the underlying physical layer. It assumes that physical layer
is error-free and the communication trace is reliable. In contrast, information theoretic se-
curity [64, 65, 66, 67, 68] exploits an advantage that is based on properties of the physical
layer, where the adversary has access to the signal from which it cannot extract information
about the message. The increasing prevalence of side-channel attacks [69, 70, 71, 72, 73]
which render cryptographic schemes vulnerable and meta-data leakages [74, 75] that create
the need for new methods that provide stronger guarantees at lower layers of the protocol
stack.
Our primary goal is to design a deniable communication channel—one that conceals
even the existence of communication—using the ubiquitous power transmission infrastruc-
ture, where the channel noise can be used as a cover for covert communication. In this
paper, we design and implement a physical-layer deniable communication system called
PowerLine Whisperer. It is deniable in the sense that it allows participants to plausibly
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Figure 5.1: Application scenario of a setup where Alice and Bob might use PowerLine
Whisperer to achieve deniable communication inside a cafe over common powerline cir-
cuit. Alice communicates to Bob in-spite of presence of an adversary connected next to
him on the same wall power-socket.
deny exchange of information between them making it statistically ambiguous for an ad-
versary to detect the presence of such communication.
Figure 5.1 illustrates a scenario where PowerLine Whisperer could be used. It shows a
generic meeting place such as a cafe. There are multiple appliances connected to powerline
channel, such as coffee machines and toasters, in addition to laptops and other computing
devices. Assume a spy in public space, whistleblower in an office setting, or an activist in
an authoritarian regime. Alice and Bob would like to communicate deniably; on the other
hand, an adversary, Willie, aims to detect the presence of such communication. Powerline
networks are isolated at the main breaker panel of the building (usually near the utility me-
ter), and adversary can be anywhere on the powerline. He may tap into a powerline system
of a commercial (ex. public spaces like coffee shops), enterprise (ex. business spaces),
or residential building at a central location [76], such as the breaker panel or distribution
board and deploy sensing technologies to surveil an entire facility. We design PowerLine
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Whisperer to function in the presence of a strong adversary who is connected to a wall
socket next to the parties who wish to communicate.
Because the primary goal of a covert channel is to deny the very presence of a signal
on a channel, unless carefully designed often at the expense of complex hardware [32],
a guided medium like powerline provides an added degree of covertness that does not
require a direct line of sight. The isolation in powerline circuits using circuit breakers
acts to our advantage as the eavesdropper requires to be connected to the same building
as the suspected parties. Usage of such systems can require massive expenditure from
administrative regimes for tapping every wall socket in a building.
Our contributions are as follows. We recognize the need for alternate tools for deniable
communication for short range message exchanges. Second, we notice that in urban set-
tings, the ubiquity of powerline network can be a useful communication medium. Third,
we notice that the noise on the powerline can be a useful covert cover itself to conceal such
communication. Fourth, we define a modulation scheme which achieves deniability on
powerline network. Finally, we implement and evaluate a prototype using software radios
which can exchange small messages up to 2KB in few seconds in a fashion that is indis-
tinguishable from ambient noise on the power line. Although these transmission rates are
relatively low, the strong deniability makes this channel appropriate for certain low-volume
communication where the communicating parties remain deniable.
5.2 Threat Model
The aim of an adversary is to detect covert communication with high confidence. The threat
model borrows the framework from Chapter 3
Basis of Deniable Communication PowerLine Whisperer builds on two fundamental ob-
servations about communication. Every message at the application layer is encoded into a
codeword which provides it reliability on the channel. Error-correcting codes protect the
message against channel errors. First observation is that even simple codes (e.g.Repetition
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codes) use a generator matrix to encode the message, which imposes a structure on the
codewords. Secondly, there is always noise on the channel which has a natural variation,
which would cause errors on any detector. The transmission of codewords cause distur-
bance on the channel distorting the distribution of channel. We exploit the above two
observations to be deniable on the channel, using the following arguments:
• Key S is used to choose random time slots at which the symbols are transmitted by
Alice. This avoids imposing structure on the channel due to time correlations that
could be introduced due to the use of different error-correcting codes. Willie does
not know the shared key and therefore is oblivious of the times at which information
is transmitted.
• The Square Root Law [20] ensures the errors introduced by the natural disturbance
in transmission of n bits is O(
√
n) when passing through a noisy channel and the
detector will not know whether the O(
√








We define the deniability of communication as the average probability of errors at the
detector as it indicates the uncertainty in the measurement of the adversary, i.e.γ = α+β
2
.
The probability of raising a false alarm is denoted byα, while the probability of mis-







of γ indicates higher deniability, as it indicates more measurement errors by the adversary.
A detector which produces a random outcome, will have a γ close to 0.5.
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5.2.1 Detection Strategy
The statistical problem at hand for detection is to decide between two alternative explana-





The Neyman-Pearson lemma can be shown to derive the form of optimum test for hy-
pothesis testing [64, Theorem 11.7.1]. This optimum test is of the form of equation 5.2
which is termed as log-likelihood ratio. It represents the probability of observations at
Willie under respective hypothesis. The test can be shown to be equivalent to computing
the KL Divergence between the true distribution and the observations under the alternate
hypothesis as shown by the equation [64, Eq 11.194]. The Lemma seeks a receiver that
would maximize the probability of correct detection while keeping the probability of false
alarm less than a specified value. It computes the ratio of conditional probability of chan-
nel output distributions, given a message was transmitted to the conditional probability of
current observation given channel noise, which will take the temporal correlations of the
channel output into account.
The transmission vector xw = [x1, x2, ...xi, xn], xi ∈ {0,1} comprising of information
bits travels through the noisy channel. Bit 1 (or bit 0) is represented by a pulse (or absence)
of 10 voltage samples ∈ {0,d}. d is a digital value. Transmission of bits affects the channel
output zw = [z1, z2, ...zi, zn] of the matched filter [77] at Willie, where zi ∈ {0,d} before
demodulated into a bit stream of {0,1}. A matched filter matches the received vector to
the basis function of the transmitted signal vector. It is a filter with an impulse response
ψ(t) = φ(T−t), t ∈ {0,T} to a signal φ(t). We use a matched filter of the transmitted signal
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P (z1, ...zn|x1, ...xn)P (x1, ...xn)
− logP (z1, ...zn|0, ...0)
(5.3)
The first term is the summation over all sets of sequences (with slight abuse of termi-
nology, we can term them as codewords) transmitted for covert message (x1, ...xn), which
contain all possible combinations of O(
√
n) information bits out of n. The a-priori proba-




n of the total n slots will have information





ways to choose the location
of injection of information bits. The total number of terms to be chosen are given by the
length of secret key,
√
n log n causing the total number of terms to be computed equal to
2
√
n logn. In our experiments, the number of bits on the wire are around
√
n (= 1024) such
that the λ(zw) is computationally prohibitive. As it is computationally hard to compute
all posterior probabilities of different sequences transmitted, we compute the amount of
disturbance on the channel to detect the presence of covert communication. It is reflected
in sufficient test statistic, the variance of the output of the observations of the matched fil-
ter. Variance is a sufficient statistic [79] for set of observations sampled from multivariate
Gaussian distributions. A statistic S(z1, ..., zn) is said to be sufficient for parameters θ of
the distribution, if the conditional distribution of z1, ..., zn given S = s, does not depend
on θ for any value of s. The sufficient statistic is important as it summarizes the sequence
of observations, without any loss of information.
We use a receiver operating characteristic curve (ROC curve) which is a single graph to
capture the performance of detection as one varies the threshold over a range of values of
the sufficient test statistic. We plot the probability of detection (1 − β) versus probability
of false alarm (α) to evaluate the deniability of communication. We indicate the optimal
point on the curve, which corresponds to the threshold that maximizes the probability of
detection by calculating the minimum distance from any point on the ROC curve to the
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upper left corner called the Point of Perfect Classification as shown in section 5.6.2.
It is important to notice that sometimes noise will cause the decoder to output a digital
value 1. The adversary does not have the secret key which is the primary cause of deni-
ability as the adversary cannot be certain that the output is corresponding to noise or an
information pulse. We discuss the tradeoff in subsection 5.6.2.
Frequency domain detection One might want to use detectors in frequency domain, in
which case it is to be noted that the matched filter projects the received signal into signal
space (basis functions) of the transmitted signal. These bases functions are equivalent to
Fourier basis in the frequency domain and we are not required to conduct analysis in the
dual space as we already use convolution operator in the time domain. Such tests will
equivalent to the test conducted in the paper.
5.3 PowerLine Whisperer
In this section, we describe the details of the components and the challenges in realizing
the design in practice. We first describe the design parameters followed by description of
transmitter and receiver blocks shown in high-level diagram in figure 5.2.
We exercise two design parameters—frequency of transmission, the bandwidth of the
channel, and the time over which the message is transmitted—can be modified to balance
the tradeoffs between deniability and throughput. We fix the pulse shape used for trans-
mitting the information bit. One can notice a pulse in spectrogram. It is to be noted that
claiming the presence of the pulse, however, is not the same as proving the presence of
communication. The aim is to use a detection strategy which observes the channel for a
period of time and takes a decision as described in subsection 5.2.1.
5.3.1 Transmitter
A message is encoded into a codeword using Reed Solomon code into vector of bits. We
pick on of several error-correction schemes [80, 81, 82] have been used on powerline com-
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Algorithm 1 Scheme to chose the O(
√
n) slots for transmission of information bits out of
total of n slots
1: procedure TRANSMISSION SLOT–SELECTION Initialize the random number genera-
tor with seed.
2: Let the message size be cM in number of bits. c is a scaling factor; n is the transmission
size.
3: for 1 . . .n do
4: Choose a number from a Bernoulli distribution (c/
√
n) generated by the ran-
dom number generator
5: Place the message bit in the slot
6: end for
7: end procedure
Transmit the whole sequence of bits (of size c
√
n) on the channel
munication for the prototype. The choice of the error correcting code does not impact the
covertness and is primarily to provide reliability. The encoded message bit sequence is
then fed into a Sequence Inflater. The sequence inflater selects the positions generated by
Algorithm 1 which is the key S, to place information bits in the long sequence as shown in
Figure 5.2), which acts a guiding principle for upper bound on number of transmissions on
the channel, reducing the search space in experimental evaluation.
First, we generate random positions for transmission of information bits by using a
Bernoulli trials with probability of (c/1024). We use a pseudo random number generator
in Linux to produce slots for transmission of message. This forbids us to claim that our
system is information-theoretic secure as lack of true randomness might impose a structure
on the transmitted sequence (but not as definite as a codeword) which can be exploited by
the adversary. The seed used to generate transmission slots can be part of secret agreement
between the parties.
The message bits are passed to a pulse interpolator (using root-raised cosine pulse)
which generates digital samples to be injected on the channel using Powerline Interface
(also called Powerline coupler). The symbols are eventually injected on channel with help
of Digital to Analog Convertor. We use non-coherent On-Off Keying (OOK) to transmit


















Figure 5.2: High level diagram of Transmitter and Receiver connected to powerline. Some















Figure 5.3: High level diagram of blocks in Transmitter chain
phases as they are spread apart in time. This is in contrast to the common modulation
schemes (including amplitude modulations) where messages are transmitted in bursts for
high throughput and clock recovery.
We transmit a preamble for the receiver to initiate message transfer. The length of
the preamble is included in the total transmission length below O(
√
n). Transmission of
preamble between covert parties can be avoided if they use other out-of-band techniques to
derive a common clock between the participants e.g. GPS disciplined oscillators.
5.3.2 Receiver
We use a non-coherent receiver that performs envelope detection. It consists of different
blocks in the reception chain of a message over the power line. The samples captured from
the physical medium using a powerline interface (i.e., a powerline coupler) are passed















Figure 5.4: High level diagram of blocks in Receiver chain connected preserve.
by a matched filter and uses a polyphase clock synchronization algorithm to sample the
resulting output. A threshold block (both not shown in the diagram for clarity purposes) is
calibrated to produce a binary value. The binary sequence which is passed into a sequence
deflater that extracts the message bits using the key S. These bits are then passed through
an error-correction decoder to obtain a message.
Challenges The messages are converted to a sequence mostly consisting of 0s, allowing
the noise between modulated pulses (corresponding to information bit 1) to cause a drift
in the receiver clock. This is in contrast to conventional hardware receiver chain, where a
scrambler is used to scramble long and randomly varying sequences of bit 0 and bit 1 to
enable clock recovery at physical layer, which helps the receiver lock on a frequency. We
solve this by increasing the number samples per pulse and increasing the roll-off factor of
the pulse.
5.4 Hardware Implementation
In this section, we detail the hardware used for building the components of that we de-
scribed in Section 5.3. We have built PowerLine Whisperer from simple hardware giving
high flexibility. Both of these components can be miniaturized as an oscillator chip and
an AC coupler within the power distribution circuit of a laptop or desktop computer for
concealment.
Commercial powerline adapters are proprietary design and are not widely available,
which makes it difficult to use for covert communication on powerline. These adapters are
incapable of covert communication at the physical layer and this work is a leading example
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towards benefiting from this untapped potential. Since, there is lack of open-source device-
drivers for Ethernet-over-power adapters, we have used Software Defined Radio (SDR),
extensively used in the wireless research community for prototyping novel ideas. A Uni-
versal Software Radio Peripheral (USRP in Figure 5.5a) acts a generic analog-to-digital
and digital to analog (a device with dimensions 22× 16× 5 cm) converter which provides
reconfiguration flexibility in the receiver and transmitter chain at the cost of its size. GNU
Radio [83] is an open-source software development platform for USRP hardware, compat-
ible with different hardware, which can also be used to build the PowerLine Whisperer. We
also use a powerline coupler, which is a printed circuit board, to transmit and receive elec-
trical signals from the RF front-end of the USRP into the wired powerline on the powerline
network.
A stealthy instantiation of PowerLine Whisperer could be miniaturized form of the
present configuration. (We have built the current prototype proof-of-concept demonstrat-
ing the feasibility of the design, rather than as a final version that might be used in de-
ployment.) There are some promising palm-size technologies on the market transceiver
like Lime-SDR [84] for frequencies range 100 KHz-3.8GHz and even smaller receivers as
RTL-SDR and AirSpy [85, 86] and we think will reduce in form-factor and allow deniable
communication on powerlines in near-future.
The setup in Figure 5.5 shows the relative placement of the different blocks used by the
two parties and the adversary. The coupler is an analog band pass filter with range of fre-
quencies between 10 kHz to 30 MHz (which are typical frequencies to observe interference
caused by electrical devices as mentioned by Gupta et al. [76]). It is a 78200-R-PL-20
Line-to-Earth Coupler with line rating of 120 VAC. The coupler is an important component
since it is used to couple the signals generated from the USRP daughterboards connected
to it over a BNC-SMA cable. We use N210 USRP [87] units for the transmitter, receiver,
and passive adversary. The USRPs use LTX/LRX daughterboards to inject and capture the






(a) A power-line coupler PCB (printed circuit board) PCB connected





(b) Schematic corresponding to the above image. Describes the rela-
tive positions of hardware components.
Figure 5.5: Setup for message injection and collection over the powerline channel.
which encompasses the range of frequency of interest. Sampling is the process of digitiz-
ing continuous band pass signals in Digital Signal Processing. The samples captured from
powerline refer to the “observations”mentioned in Section 3. We sample the continuous
waveforms on the powerline channel to generate digital samples in discrete time domain
and then conduct an investigation on the samples to calculate deniability of PowerLine
Whisperer.
Calibration The USRP daughterboard transmitter front-end has a transmission power of
7dBm. We modify the baseband magnitude to vary the transmitter power. We calibrate the
receiver which decides its decoding capability at low signal to noise ratio and apply error
correction to retrieve the message using the secret key. The threshold for an information










Monitor On CFL On
Figure 5.6: Capture of EMI produced by different appliances connected to an isolated trans-
former for identifying different frequencies of devices for annotation. PowerLine Whis-
perer uses the presence of noise on powerline for deniable communication. The noise
present at 500 KHz is an artifact of the daughter board used of signal capture and not due
to any device.
the ambient noise floor is higher, the threshold of the receiver matched filter should also
be higher to calibrate the device for low false positives. We use the Threshold block, to
convert the digital output of matched filter into a binary output of bit 0 or 1. False positives
occur when adversary claims that a bit is transmitted when it is actually not transmitted,
instead the noise matches at the instance of the information pulse. It means the adversary
has falsely decoded a noise pulse as a binary value 1 at the output of the matched filter. We
notice in Figure 5.8a that noise will also produce a significant output at the matched filter.
False negatives occur when an information bit 0 is transmitted but the adversary’s matched
filter is not able to detect because it does not have the secret key.
5.5 Primer: Ambient Powerline Noise
In this section we elaborate on our experience with powerline noise. Figure 5.6 shows
characteristic noise generated from electrical activities on powerline circuits by the devices
such as CFL bulbs, desktop computers, laptops, LCD monitor connected to it, apart from
the background noise in an isolated environment a Line Isolation transformer in the lab
setting (Tripp Lite 500W isolation transformer). There is presence of various appliances on
powerlines such as resistive loads (electric oven, microwave door lights etc) and inductive
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loads (mechanically switched dryer, dishwasher etc) which do not produce large electrical
noise but they produce thermal noise (johnson noise) and transient noise due to making
and breaking of circuits in switches. Loads drawing more than .25 amps produce large
transient noise and more prominent continuous electrical noise due to switching mode [88].
We observe the prevalence of noise in the frequency ranges of the powerline (i.e. 10 kHz
to 30 MHz) and propose that covert communications can be injected in any part of the
frequency spectrum in this range, with sufficient noise. Gupta [76] et al. built on the
assumption that noise on powerline channel can be modeled as additive white Gaussian
noise (AWGN) at lower frequencies. Our experience show that the noise is colored and can
be a mixture of Gaussians. This means that the power spectral density of powerline channel
varies with frequency. Small frequency bands can be found to have almost constant power
spectral density. The lower frequencies within the range of few kiloHertz have high noise
floor depending on the presence of number of devices in use while the higher frequencies
contain the harmonics.
The powerlines can be made from different types of cables and with different periods
of installation causing differences. Our experiments have suggested that all devices might
not show strong presence of characteristic frequency(switching frequency of the converter)
unless they are using SMPS converters including certain light bulbs (excluding CFL). We
have found that enterprise buildings have multiple independent powerline circuits, some of
which are heavily loaded with devices while others are relatively clean and have a trend
with time of day. The parameter space for PowerLine Whisperer is vast as it can operate
on vast range of frequencies, at different times of day and depending on the density of
appliances and users that it is difficult to draw a baseline characterization of the channel
in different practical settings. This makes the adversary’s job harder to detect covert com-
munication as he does not have a baseline of noise for comparison and aids in providing
deniability to the users.
One can observe the modalities in the noise in frequency domain and use the opera-
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tional state of various devices using a Gaussian function (mean and variance) to communi-
cate. There is an inherent variability in the noise generated by devices due to the tolerance
in components. This nature of noise can also be a cause of deniability. Changing the op-
erational state of the device to modulate bits is interesting but most of the devices are not
programmable and would require to be modify their configuration manually by user. We
discuss a programmable device (e.g. laptop in section 5.7. Instead of restricting to noise
generated by specific device at specific frequency, we allow a generic system to transmit
on different frequencies with background noise as message cover.
The Square Root Law holds for Additive White Gaussian noise and the powerline noise
might be multivariate Gaussian in amplitude and might not be strictly white. We can de-
compose the colored spectrum into smaller frequency ranges of constant power spectral
density (white) and apply the law.
5.6 Evaluation
In this section we answer the following questions in our empirical evaluation of the Power-
Line Whisperer prototype:
1. To what extent is communication deniable?
2. What throughput does PowerLine Whisperer provide?
We first conduct real world experiments followed by controlled experiment suggesting the
limits on throughput of the scheme.
5.6.1 Experiment Setup
We use our hardware setup and pre-select parameters such as frequency and bandwidth of
transmission for our evaluations, as we discuss below. We do our experiments at different
frequencies of 1.8 MHz, 2.6 MHz, 3.5 MHz in enterprise, commercial and residential en-
vironments. We choose different frequencies as they provide high noise cover for message
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exchange. The transmitter uses a 200 KHz signal to transmit covert messages while the
adversary over-samples the signal by factor of 10.
The operation regime of PowerLine Whisperer depends on a number of factors from he
nature and activity on the channel governing the noise characteristic to the sensitivity of the
adversary. In our experiments, we transmit over a total number of slots of n = 1024∗1024,
with time for one slot being the same as time to transmit one bit. For a constant
√
n, we
change transmission size linearly from factor (c=) from 3 to 15 for different messages sizes
(detailed description in subsection 5.6.3.)
We model our adversary connected to a single vantage point, and claim that presence of
adversary at multiple vantage points is not helpful in the joint analysis of the traces as the
signal and noise will attenuate with line impedance (which is function of distance) between
the point of sensing and the point of transmission. We allow the adversary to plug its mea-
surement device in the wall socket next to the transmitter and operate in the same frequency
range electrical voltages using USRP and conducts measurements at the same frequency
as the transmitter in our experiments. The adversary is oblivious of the frequency and
bandwidth of signal and captures a wider spectrum of 2 MHz. Practically, communicating
parties can make the frequency and transmission bandwidth a part of the secret agreement
needed to bootstrap the communication, hence the leeway available to hide messages is
actually much higher, as is the difficulty for the adversary to detect the communication.
If the adversary knows the exact bandwidth of operation, it reduces the throughput of the
covert parties although still allow communication to take place. In practical scenario, the
colluding parties can always move to less adversarial powerline socket.
Measurements We conduct several trials on the powerline channel with equal number
of the experiments conducted in presence of the covert communication as the number of
experiments in the absence of any communication aiding to establish the ground truth. The
experiments are conducted for the same period of 5.2 seconds which is constant across all












Figure 5.7: Figure shows the 2 MHz band spectrum centered at 900 kHz showing covert
transmission in enterprise setting. The top half of the channel shows a time period when
there is no message injection. The lower half of the channel shows PowerLine Whisperer
in operation. Powerline has different frequencies where noise looks similar to the covert
message. It looks innocuous to the naked eye. We further investigate using fundamental
ground of statistical testing.
channel use out of n.
5.6.2 Deniability of Communication
Figure 5.7 shows a spectrogram of enterprise powerline channel where the top half is the
channel without transmission and the lower half shows covert transmissions. It is possible
to see a pulse on a spectrogram, which seems innocuous. One can use a different pulse
shape similar to noise, which will give different tradeoffs in evaluation. It is important
to understand that claiming the presence of a pulse, however, is not the same as proving
the presence of communication. The aim is to use a detection strategy which observes the
channel for a period of time and takes a decision as described in subsection 5.2.1. The
reason for adversary’s inability to distinguish between noise and signal pulses on average
is because the KL divergence between the two distributions is negligible. KL divergence is
the measure of the adversary’s ability to distinguish, and we use framework of hypothesis
testing to evaluate it.
Figure 5.8 shows transmissions captured at the adversary, identifying the change in
the distribution of the output of matched filter in residential setting. The variance in case
of noise 5.8a is 76.38, in the presence of covert communication 5.8b is of 2KB is 70.06




























(a) Channel profile in absence of




























(b) Channel profile after injec-




























(c) Channel profile after
injection of continuous pulse
train(shifted mean and variance).
Figure 5.8: The three sub-plots show normalized histograms of output of sufficient statis-
tic at 3.5 MHz transmission frequency and 2 MHz bandwidth in residential setting. The
figure demonstrate the channel output in extreme conditions and the fact that the covert
communication will resembles noise profile.
constant train pulses by the covert transmitter in a pathological case of high throughput
overt communication 5.8c. The fundamental idea for covert transmission is to be close to
the original distribution of noise by sparse transmissions over a period of time.
Figure 5.9 shows why it is challenging for an adversary to detect communication with
PowerLine Whisperer. We consider a set of 200 experimental trials measured at the adver-
sary, half of which contained covert communication. In this case, suppose the adversary
uses a threshold on the sufficient statistic, that is, the variance of the distribution output
matched filter to determine the presence of covert communication.
The blue curve (with star points) in Figure 5.9 shows the empirical probability that a
trial with covert communication present is detected by the adversary, as the threshold on
the variance of the sufficient statistic is varied. Notice that by choosing a low value of the
threshold (left half of the graph), it is possible to detect almost all covert transmissions.
However, the adversary would also detect several trials which did not have covert commu-
nication. We show this in the red curve (with dot points), which captures the empirical
probability that a trial actually contains a covert communication given that it is detected by
the adversary.
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Variance of output distribution of matched-filter (no unit) 
Figure 5.9: The tradeoff at the adversary in qualifying a detection as covert communication
or noise with variation in the value of threshold at the detector. The threshold is the variance
of the output of the matched filter. Figure shows how the variation in the Left y-axis shows
True Positive (1− β) and right y-axis shows False Positives (α).
The situation on the right half of this graph is the opposite. At the cross-over between
the two curves, the adversary would be unable to distinguish a detection of covert com-
munication from an actual covert communication with more than a (roughly) 50% chance.
This is an inherent tradeoff present in any detector. The best operating point corresponds
to a point where the probability of detection is the greatest, given the lowest probability of
error, which is evaluated using ROC curve.
The ROC curve in Figure 5.10 shows the variation in deniability on powerline in an en-
terprise setting. Every point on the curve describes the false positive rate and true positive
rate for a threshold value at the adversary. We show 95% confidence intervals in the rate of
detection at a steady change of threshold values. The tight error bounds show that measure-
ments are meaningful. We observed tight confidence intervals for false positive rates, but
we chose not to plot them to provide visual clarity to users. γw denotes the deniability in-




























AUC (0.67 Kbps)= 0.529
AUC (1.38 Kbps)= 0.535






Figure 5.10: The plot shows ROC curve at the adversary with change in message size in an
enterprise setting. The sender operates at 1.8 MHz.
They are at a minimum distance from the point of perfect classification, corresponding to
a threshold that gives the maximum probability of detection or minimizes the probability
of error of the detector, corresponding to Neyman-Pearson Lemma discussed in section 5.2
(having the least error detection probability) for statistical hypothesis testing under the two
distributions.
This is the worst possible threshold for point of view of the colluding parties for each
case of message throughput and shows one can be deniable during message exchange. We
get a deniability of greater than 0.4 most experiments. This number itself encodes the
information about how good or bad is the detection with respect to noise (as we conduct




























AUC (0.67 Kbps)= 0.531
AUC (1.38 Kbps)= 0.555





Figure 5.11: The plot shows ROC curve at the adversary with change in message size in a
residential setting. The sender operates at 3.5 MHz
observation 4 out of 10 times to detect the covert communication (close to half the time.)
The ROC curve in Figure 5.11 shows the variation in deniability in a residential setting.
The actual receiver of the message can always decode the message in these experiments.
The value of area under the curve being close to 0.5 suggests the ROC curve of the detector
is close to the line of no discrimination (1 − β = α). It shows the low accuracy of Log-
likelihood ratio test (near-optimal test) which detects as many true positives (1− β) as the
number of false positives α.
The ROC curve in Figure 5.12 shows the performance of the detector in a commercial
environment of a student cafe. The deniability offered in cafe assumes to be seemingly less




























AUC ( 0.67 Kbps)= 0.501
AUC (1.38 Kbps)= 0.510





Figure 5.12: The plot shows ROC curve at the adversary with change in message size in a
commercial setting. The sender operates at 2.6 MHz.
hardly any students around when the experiments were conducted in the late hours of the
day. We later show trends in how the noise power changes during the evening hours in the
enterprise setting.
5.6.3 Throughput
The physical layer on the power line does not have a link layer protocol in our setting,
allowing transmission of bits allowing us to transmit at the rate we inject data on the chan-
nel, without conventional link-layer back-offs. We defined throughput as the rate we inject
the message into the channel. Short messaging might range from hundreds of bytes (eg.
“tweets”) to larger message sizes. We use message sizes of 432, 896, 2008 bytes to be
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Table 5.1: We summarize the results of experiments showing the variation of Area under
Curve with bit-rate achieved in different environmental conditions.
Bitrate (Kbps) 3.08 1.37 0.67
Commercial (2.6 MHz) 0.501 0.510 0.531
Residential (3.5 MHz) 0.531 0.555 0.575
Enterprise (1.8 MHz) 0.529 0.535 0.561
transmitted over the channel over a constant period of 5.2 seconds. We ran experiments for
a single message over several runs but one can transmit messages over sustained period of
time.
Table 5.1 shows the variation of the Area Under Curve (AUC) with the bit-rate achieved
in commercial, residential, and enterprise settings. The table shows that increasing the bit-
rate reduces the deniability of PowerLine Whisperer. Figure 5.13 shows the similarity in
the channel distribution of 150 experiment runs each during the presence of only noise and
covert message transfer. The slight difference in the shape can be equally attributed to
channel noise or to message transfer, giving the inherent deniability to leverage noise at the
physical layer to user’s advantage.
In our measurements in different environments, we found 22 devices in enterprise, 8
devices in home and 3 in cafe. The devices can be at different distances from wall-socket
and might not contribute to noise as much as the devices plugged near. Since the operating
conditions in different environments vary due to the number of devices and the character-
istic of noise generated by each of them, nature of the background noise due to type and
lifetime of powerline cables, it is difficult to compare the detection accuracy of the detector
with number of devices. We conduct controlled experiments to observe the trend in Fig-
ure 5.14 in the accuracy of detector by injecting 2 KB message on a separate transformer
with increasing the number of devices from 1 to 4. We find that the accuracy of the detector
decreases with the number of devices as expected. Since it is not feasible to model signa-
ture of every device in different environments and account for variability of each of them
while they perform different tasks (section on SMPS noise) and cancel the noise generated,
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(a) Histogram of 150 experiment trials of powerline channel with channel noise in an enterprise
setup.






(b) Histogram of 150 experimental observations of powerline channel with covert message injection
in an enterprise setup.
Figure 5.13: The histograms of the measurements in the presence and absence of measure-
ment show non-significant difference providing deniability to the users.
we conduct 200 control experiments to test the scheme on an isolated powerline using an
isolation transformer at 1 MHz. We achieve a throughput of 146 bps for deniability index of
0.43. We think PowerLine Whisperer can provide a meaningful communication throughput
in real settings with increase in noise.
We understand that the more knowledge an adversary has about the underlying distribu-
tion, the more difficult it is to produce a higher throughput deniable communication chan-
nel. We think PowerLine Whisperer can provide a meaningful communication throughput




























AUC (1 device )= 0.791
AUC (2 devices)= 0.708





Figure 5.14: The plot shows ROC curve at the decrease in the accuracy of the adversary
when the number of devices are increased for constant message size.
5.7 Discussion and Future Work
Pulse shape We can design different pulse shape and corresponding receivers, for the pur-
pose of different degree of covertness. We can interpolate noise pulse shapes of different
appliances and design a pulse shape using empirical noise on a specific channel in Pow-
erLine Whisperer. This might be appealing to the human eye and one might claim it is
a better covert communication scheme, but an optimal detector (or near-optimal detector
used) will analyze the system in a manner exactly as described in the paper.
SMPS Noise We can build a covert channel using SMPS noise produced by the powered











(a) Spectrogram (4096 pt) for a signal generated by SMPS convertor inside a laptop adapter sampled
at 125 Ksamples/sec.
time (sec)
(b) Received bits messages using FSK demodulation
Figure 5.15: Deniable Communication using SMPS noise
periments with different models of laptops and other devices such as TP-Link router and
found this phenomenon is present in almost all computing devices. Figure 5.15a shows
message transmission due to variation computation load on a laptop and Figure 5.15b
shows the demodulated using Frequency Shift Keying (FSK). This scheme will also re-
quire software-defined radio to capture signals from powerline with a receiver chain using
a matched filter (with pulse of shape of average noise bursts from the adapter) generated
by the laptop adapter. Such a scheme is interesting but restricted to frequencies around the
switching frequency of the SMPS converter of a device, restricting a degree of freedom
in PowerLine Whisperer. Deniability in such cases will require one to model the normal
workload of such devices. Frequency modulation of such scheme is slow due to the ana-
log circuitry (capacitance and inductance) and produces low throughput for an adversary
model described in the paper.
Connection to Networking Stack Our current scheme demonstrates a working prototype
on a single transmission link and as follow up, we are interested how to extend the scheme
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Figure 5.16: Change in noise power(variance) with time of day. Each box-plot is for obser-
vations every 20 seconds over the previous 1.5 hours. Possibly indicating people leaving
for home in the evening.
over multiple grids and cities. We are also interested in how we can interplay our scheme
with services on the Internet and the infrastructure required to build it. It also requires
multi-user MAC protocol and interfacing it with a transport protocol such as UDP for large
message transfers.
Applications in Air Gap Systems Assume an enterprise organization’s Ethernet network
equipped with different levels of access rights; different users in the same building might
have machines that are connected to different switch ports and accordingly assigned to
different VLANs, as a means of isolating their communication from one another. The
powerline can be used to covertly bridge these ”gaps”. Since the users are deniable, they
cannot be strictly held responsible for using the channel. It enables communication across
multiple rooms within a building that are not otherwise connected by Ethernet (i.e., an “air
gap”).
Time of day effects There is natural variability present in power-line networks, which
might vary due to several reasons including human activity, weather or power faults in
the power-line. Such effects, although variable can have a periodicity at different scales
spanning a few days to the time of the day as captured in Figure 5.16. This can give an
added advantage to the users if they have the knowledge of frequency ranges which are
noisier and more suitable for deniable communication due to activity on power-line.






Figure 5.17: Connecting PowerLine Whisperer to Tor Network
It might be interesting to connect PowerLine Whisperer to Tor where one can add hard-
ware box (as shown in Figure 5.17) which converts messages on Power-line messages to
Ethernet which can then be relayed on the Internet. This can be used for deniable or anony-
mous message boards although it might be tough to maintain TCP connection at low con-
nection speed. These portals might be public where people can go and plug in their laptop
to send messages. This solution is better against an Internet-Wide Adversary than a local
adversary for two reasons. First, the Internet-Wide global adversary does not have any idea
about local power-line networks. Second, boxes (power-line to Ethernet converter) can be
as small as Raspberry Pi and be readily deployed like Onion routers.
Jamming the channel PowerLine Whisperer cannot communicate if an adversary can jam
the entire channel, although it seems impractical. The users may choose to operate in a
different frequency band as powerline offers a wide range of frequencies (order of GHz).
A practical adversary might want to inject pulses in between the transmission sequence.
Such an adversary can best be evaded by using better error correcting codes.
Random Number Generator We have thought about and understand that the random num-
ber generator provided by Linux kernel does not have all properties to generate the random
numbers to claim the scheme to be Information theoretic secure but it does provide some-
thing practical to be used. The effect of not using a perfect random number generator is
that it will introduce a structure on the transmitted sequence of bits which will not appear
completely random to the adversary.
Extensions to Multi-user settings It would be possible to extend such message exchange
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in practical settings, but a congestion of multiple users at the same frequency and time
might increase the overall energy on the channel which would raise suspicion in a restrictive
setting but might be possible in practical settings.
5.8 Summary
We built PowerLine Whisperer, first of its kind physical-layer deniable channel on power-
line against a strong adversarial model having rigorous theoretical grounding. It is flexible
in operation and simple in design, providing selective use of the channel, opening exciting
directions to use power-line channel for covert communication. It uses ubiquitous power-




In conclusion, I will reiterate the point that there is no single solution that can provide
deniability in every setting – wide area or near field. In near-fields, one would like to
compare the performance of DenaLi and PowerLine Whisperer.
As one would have noticed, these two systems operate at two different layers of the
networking stack. Although the cause of corruption of bits is noise, the noise profile would
be different in each case. One can also notice that the Wifi and Power-line have different
channel models. The modulation scheme (Phase-Shift Keying) in DenaLi was used for
spectral efficiency than for covertness, while the modulation scheme (On-Off Keying) in
PowerLine Whisperer is suited for the purpose of providing covertness.
To compare the bitrates, we should be able to compare the noise in common-metric. In
Wifi, quantification of noise in link layer is represented by errors in different positions of
bits we compare the noise using the distribution over bit error rate. In Power-line, we com-
pare the distribution of sufficient statistic over the output of matched-filter. In the former
case, it is computed over distribution after hard-decoding of bits while in the latter case,
the distribution is over computer over voltages before hard decoding of bits. The definition
of deniability can be derived from the equation α+β = 1−V (Q̂n, Qn0 ), where Qn0 , Q̂n are
the distribution of channel in the absence and presence of covert communication and α, β
are the probabilities of type I, II errors. In DenaLi, we use the right-hand side to derive the
value of deniability by comparing the two distribution using correlation coefficient to test
the linearity in the distribution. In PowerLine Whisperer, we recognize the limitation of
estimating the error distribution under different hypothesis and instead calculate the proba-
bilities of error in detection. The detectors used are similar in nature, but they are different
in operation. They are similar as they are computing the error (doubt of adversary) but it
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is different as they compute different sides of the equation. The placement of adversary
and the capabilities of the adversary are not the same. In DenaLi, the user can improve
the deniable communication throughput by increasing the cover traffic, while PowerLine
Whisperer is dependent on underlying channel noise distribution which is not in control of
the user to be perturbed to his advantage. A 6 bps rate for 2 Mbps cover traffic against an
adversary operating at link layer is different from 146 bps against an adversary operating at
physical layer as the threat models are different. A higher value of throughput might not be
a direct conclusion about which system is better since the way the base distribution of noise
appearing at the two layers is different (and difficult to be put in a common metric). There
is a difference in the computation of deniability metric in the two cases, which suggests
that the number might not be an absolute value that can be compared across two systems.
6.1 Summary of contributions
This thesis has demonstrated that one can do deniable communication. In doing so, we
made the following contributions:
1. Two systems for conducting and measuring deniability of communication. DenaLi
and PowerLine Whisperer are two systems which are useful in doing deniable com-
munication using two different mediums - Wireless and Power-line.
2. Technique for deniable message transfer. We explored how private communication
in the future might be protected by DenaLi. DenaLi’s security properties will be
invaluable against future attackers, which could be used by people in pairs in close
proximity. To explore beyond the limitations imposed by a wireless ASIC, we used
Software-defined radios to conduct finer measurements using PowerLine Whisperer.
In doing so we explored a much deeper body of the covert communication chan-
nel using information theoretic modeling which provides fundamental limitations on
such systems.
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Figure 6.1: Future directions for near-field tools for Deniable communication
6.2 Future work
We conclude by summarizing promising research to be done in building deniable commu-
nication systems. I have attempted to build point-to-point deniable communication systems
during my research. Much of the interest has been in finding out if such systems can be-
come reality in the first place.
As wireless communication is improving with the advent of new protocols (802.11 n,
ac), there are differences how the channel models are used by the new schemes. There
are more antennas used for spatial diversity and the mechanism for transmissions whereby
more than one packet might be transmitted in the air simultaneously are challenging to use
the 802.11 a,b,g specifications. The newer protocols change how the packets are queued in
the buffers in the device drivers, which in turn can cause a vulnerability in implementations
of the idea of using corrupted frames in wireless networks. Although the user can always
choose to not use the latest protocols for communication.
Some of the vendors have open-sourced their drivers with contributions from Qual-
comm Atheros and Broadcom, others have not while they continue to deal differently with
their wireless transmission (Broadcom or Intel). Discussing powerful ideas of deniability
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out for discussion and explaining the purpose of such schemes might motivate the compa-
nies to be open to provide certain functionalities in their commercial chipsets, which will
immensely increase the adoption of such mechanisms in the future.
Reducing the form factor of a system like PowerLine Whisperer, might be the biggest
challenge. While there is an obvious adoption of wireless technology for communication,
it is not the case with powerlines. We haven’t been able to find an open-sourced Ethernet-
over-power card but using such schemes over commercial products can be advantageous
for deniable communication in the future. There are software-defined radios coming up
on the market with reduced form-factor [84] and it will be interesting to use PowerLine
Whisperer on it. As technology evolves, we can move towards the lower right quadrant
of Figure 6.1 where we can find a reasonable tradeoff at an operational point between the
form-factor and the flexibility allowing deniability on the channel as well as in physical
appearance to users.
6.3 Applying techniques to other problems
Power-line networks might have an untapped potential in context of securing devices in
home and away. Internet of Things has proliferated the commercial market in recent years
with exciting use of technology augmenting human experience. Rapid deployment of IoT
devices has not left enough time for developing security solutions leaving millions of de-
vices as ticking time-bombs on the Internet being exploited by hackers in recent past.
Power-line is an essential backbone that can be used to maneuver around this potential
threat by leveraging information leakage from these computing devices. We further the
pursuit of information leakage from power-lines which uses the noise generated by SMPS
transformers to detect anomalous activities by a computing device.
The Internet of things eco-system is vulnerable to security threats from hackers around
the globe. There are many IoT devices online and there are no tools to check the health of
these devices. We attempt to un-obstrusively detect security breaches in IoT devices be-
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fore and report it to users with the devices installed using a mobile application. Figure 5.6
shows electromagnetic interference generated by devices on power-line channel. These
emanations are primarily caused due to SMPS (Switched Mode Power Supply) [89]. Cur-
rent solutions where one device(sensor) monitoring consumed power by the device can be
very limiting, we try to look for centralized approach where one could use the interference
produced on power-line to reveal anomalous behavior on a computing device. Nature of
such activities can vary depending on the kind of devices and can be evaluated using differ-
ent micro-benchmarks. First, Radiated mode where AC power chord is an efficient antenna
with length quarter of wavelength for the RFI frequencies present in digital equipment and
switching power supplies. Second is the conducted mode. This is further characterized
into two modes - Common mode (asymmetrical) where RFI is present on both the line
and neutral current paths with reference to the ground or earth path. Differential mode
(symmetrical) RFI is present as a voltage between the line and neutral leads.
Computing devices run at the rate of few gigahertz clock frequency and instructions
last over few nanoseconds. The accurate regeneration of the instructions requires high sam-
pling rate > 50 Gsamples/sec are very expensive (order of few hundred thousand dollars).
Modeling general purpose computer state space is infeasible and hence we have adopted
a black-box approach, which enables us to focus only on signals that are consistent and
causal with different activities. At best one can get coarse representation of instructions
executed on devices using inexpensive equipment. We find side-channel analysis of power-
line characteristics of devices an interesting direction to investigate the EMI signatures of
software operating on device. In this work tries, we perform coarse grained analysis of
the activities of IoT devices. Such an analysis can be done non-intrusively by connecting
the system into existing power-line channel. Our approach is non-invasive as it does not
require one to open the device chassis. We thus think, it provides a new attack vector to the
current approaches which can be complimentary to network traffic analysis.
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6.3.1 Experimental Observations
We conducted experiments on the following set of devices listed in a table 6.1. We installed
a Line Isolation transformer in the lab setting (Tripp Lite 500W isolation transformer),
which isolates the system from most of EMI present on the power-line, so that we can
clearly observe the EMI generated by our micro benchmarks. All our results are based on
this independent installation setup. The devices run the scheduled OS processes as on usual
system boot. Figure 4.1 describes the physical setup of connecting a computing device
next to the data collection setup to extract electrical voltage samples from power-line using
GnuRadio [83] which uses a 14 bit ADC.
TP-Link Router OpenWrt
Raspberry Pi 3 Debian
Amcrest View Camera Proprietary
Nest Camera Propreitary
Amazon Echo Proprietary
Table 6.1: Devices used and the operating system running on them
We found adapters of some devices like TP-Link router, Raspberry Pi and amcrest view
camera emit EMI on the channel reflecting the state of device. The following spectrograms
visually represent the different EMI generated by Raspberry Pi.
Due to lack of original malware samples running on devices, we ran a client cpuminer
to mine crypto-currency Litecoin on Raspberry Pi on an isolated power-line. This is to
emulate the workload of an IoT botnet called Linux.Darlloz. Figure 6.2 shows the EMI
generated by the process while mining crypto-currency.
Similarly, we configure a client binary of Mirai botnet [90] on Raspberry Pi and com-
pare the EMI signature of a deniale-of-service attack with normal network activity of soft-
ware updates on the device and we can observe remarkable difference in the EMI generated.
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litecoin miner run batches
Figure 6.2: Spectrogram of a crypto-currency (litecoin) mining on Raspberry Pi using min-
ing client cpuminer
Unfortunately, we were not able to visually observe remarkable differences in the EMI
generated by the device correlated with device activity in Amazon Echo and Google Nest
Camera. This might be due to the shielding of the EMI generated by the shielding filters
on the adapter.
Due to lack of time, we were unable to use beamforming to separate the noise generated
from specific device from the noise generated by other devices and I think this is a very
interesting area for future research. One can envision building a small prototype which can
be plugged into home powerline network to detect infected devices. There might be high
computation cost for processing the data generated from sampling from powerline but one
can use GPUs as they have become main compute engines for todays high performance
computing [91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96].
6.3.2 Limitation
There are certain limitations of the approach because of which we are unable to observe
the state of devices such as Amazon Echo or Google Nest because the adapters might be
shielding the EMI generated by the transformer in the device adapters. This is expected
behavior of the device which follows regulations on the amount of EMI that is generated
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(a) Spectral signature of package update (apt-get install texlive-base)




























(b) Spectral signature of operating system update (apt-get update)




























(c) Spectral signature of UDP DoS attack of Mirai botnet
Figure 6.3: Spectral signatures of part of traces of different activities on Raspberry Pi
by it. Due to the usage of a proprietary hardware which allows us to sample from the
channel, we are unable to verify the frequency response of the analog filter. It is unclear
that how much improvement in the hardware coupler can provide an insight into what can
be inferred from the channel EMI.
6.3.3 Take Away
We see the signatures of different activities on power-line in controlled setting and there is
a causation between the activity on the device and the EMI generated on the power-line.
Experiments conducted on live power-line on university infrastructure has shown immense
interference from the devices already present on the channel which overpowers the noise
generated by Raspberry Pi and router adapters. This leaves a lot room for further investi-
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